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ABSTRACT
Kim, KiHyung Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. Strategic Flexibility. Major Professor: Abhijit Deshmukh.
A flexible system is defined as one that can change the entity’s stance, capability
or status reacting to a change of the entity’s environment. Flexibility has gathered
the attention of academic researchers and industry practitioners as an efficient approach to cope with today’s volatile environment. As the environments become more
unpredictable and volatile, it is imperative for a flexible system to respond quickly to
a change in its circumstance. How much flexibility is embedded into the system also
has a critical impact on the long-term effectiveness of the flexible system. Moreover,
this research focuses on the strategic environment where a decision maker’s behavior
influences other decision makers’ and vice versa.
The primary objectives of this dissertation are developing a concrete framework
for designing a flexible system by considering the exercise delay as a measure of
flexibility and investigating the rational behaviors of decision makers who operate
flexible systems under strategic environments. The general approach employed to
develop the theoretical models for this dissertation includes optimal control theory,
non-linear optimization, stochastic differential equation and game theory.
The first part of this research studies the optimal decisions on a flexible system
with exercise delay within stochastic environments by postulating two level decisions, operational level and design level decisions. The operational level problem is
modeled as a delayed optimal stopping time problem, and this research provides a
comprehensive profile of the optimal operational policies according to the parameters
representing the market conditions and characteristics of the alternative and designed
features of the flexible system. In addition, the profile elucidates the interdependence

ix
between the operational level decision and the design level decision separating the entire domain of the design problem into sub-regions. This research effort finds that the
design problem is decomposable with well-behaved non-linear optimization problems,
and provides illustrative examples to show the usefulness of the developed framework.
The second part of this research concentrates on strategic environments which
force a decision maker to cope with both exogenous uncertainty and endogenous interactions among decision makers. As the strategic environment, a duopoly market
share competition is postulated where the total market profit is regarded as the underlying uncertainty. The player retaining an exclusive patent is regarded as a player
competing in the market with a flexible system that does not have exercise delay, and
the other competitor is interpreted as a player operating a flexible system with exercise delay. The open loop and closed loop information structures are considered for
each model. The results showed that the open loop equilibrium is unique dominant
strategy equilibrium. An interesting implication of the open loop equilibria is that the
profitability of the flexible option decides the role of its owner in the duopoly market
competition. This research finds that the closed loop equilibrium has two distinctive
forms. When the asymmetry of exercise delay is large, the closed loop equilibrium is
identical to the open loop equilibrium. On the other hand, if the asymmetry provides
only a small enough advantage to the player who has a flexible option without exercise delay, the rational behaviors of the players are complicated in the closed loop
equilibrium. The first insight from the closed loop equilibrium with large asymmetry
is that the closed loop information structure hastens the execution of flexible options,
and it results in lower payoffs to both of the players. Second, the role of each player
is determined not only by the characteristics of the flexible options but also by the
value of stochastic factor. Third, even the player with a competitive disadvantage
from the asymmetry has a positive chance to be the leader of the market.
This research contributes to the area within industrial engineering and operations
research by improving the current theoretical achievement of flexibility. The accom-

x
plishments of this work provides insights to various domains those would benefit from
enhanced flexibility in the decision making process.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

Motivation
Flexibility has gathered the attention of academic researchers and industry prac-

titioners as an efficient approach to cope with future uncertainty. A flexible system
is defined as one that can change the entity’s stance, capability or status reacting
to a change of the entity’s environment. Needless to say, future uncertainty is an
important factor that decision makers have to deal with, and it becomes even more
vital in today’s volatile environment. Since a flexible system can take the best action
within its available options, it is regarded as an effective approach to manage future
uncertainty. As the environments become more unpredictable and volatile, it is imperative for a flexible system to respond quickly to a change of its circumstance. How
much flexibility is embedded into the flexible system also has critical impact on the
long-term effectiveness of the flexible system. Moreover, it is necessary to scrutinize
the environment of a system to utilize the benefit from flexibility. Among the environmental characteristics, this research focuses on the strategic environment where
a decision maker’s behavior influences other decision makers’. Since the interactions
among decision makers cause a different type of risk from that which the classical
flexibility approach deals with, it is essential to consider the strategic environment
appropriately.
The usefulness of flexibility under stochastic environments becomes clear, when it
is compared to the traditional theory. According to Dixit and Pindyck [1], the orthodox theory that is mainly based on Net Present Value (NPV) approach has drawbacks
in complex and volatile environments. They pointed out that the traditional approach
is valid for a reversible decision or a “now or never” type decision. Because NPV is
based on the estimated future uncertainty, estimation risks are inherent in the tradi-
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tional approach. In other words, the estimation may not describe the future states
appropriately, and it can cause an unsatisfactory decision under unstable situations.
The traditional approach implicitly assumes that a decision maker can revise the
decision that is turned out to be grounded in unsatisfactory estimation. However,
many of decisions are irreversible in reality. When the decision is irreversible, decision makers prefer flexible decision making that enables to postpone the decision
until the underlying uncertainty is resolved enough to avoid the estimation risk. Although, the traditional theory is appropriate for the situations when a decision must
be made now or the opportunity to take the action disappears forever, the approach
is not adequate for flexible decision making. Because of these reasons, flexibility is
increasingly turned to as an effective approach to dealing with uncertainty in systems.
This research extends current research of flexibility by considering exercise delay
that does not get enough attention from decision makers. The extent of flexibility can
be measured in a number of different ways. For example, the overall cost to change
the capacity of a system [2], the extend of possible choices [3], and the states that a
flexible system is efficient in [4] are suggested measures of flexibility. This research
focuses on the time delay between different system states, or the time required to
flex the system. The author believes how quickly a system can implement a flexible
decision is an essential measure of any system that is considered flexible. After all,
given enough time and resources, any system can be considered flexible. With this in
mind, the delay between the time a decision is made and the time that decision takes
effect becomes a useful notion of flexibility, which is called “exercise delay.” Systems
with greater flexibility will have shorter exercise delay, whereas less flexible systems
will have greater delays. How United Colors of Benetton acquired its competitive
advantage in the fashion industry is a well-known real world example showing the
importance of exercise delay [5]. Since customers’ preferences to color is volatile and
difficult to predict, Benetton employed the “Knit now, Dye later” policy. Benetton
produces clothes without colors and dyes pre-produced clothes when the new season’s
popular color fashions become apparent. Because of the ability adapting Benetton’s
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items for the change of customers’ preference quickly, it was popular in the 1980s and
the 1990s. This research regards exercise delay as an essential component of a flexible
system.
The efficiency of a flexible system is determined by not only how well the system
is operated but also by how much flexibility is embedded in the system. For instance,
suppose that a man is stranded on a desolate island with a Swiss Army Knife and
canned foods. Unless the knife is equipped with a can opener, it is not very useful for
his survival. This hypothetical example illustrates that the flexible system may not
be effective no matter how well the system is operated, if it is ill-designed. Since the
design of a flexible system has been studied mainly in the view point of capability
change, the literature lacks a formal approach to studying the optimal design or level
of flexibility with respect to the exercise delay.
Insufficient consideration of the strategic environment can cause dire consequences
for the system; especially when the other decision makers are uncooperative. A decision maker may overestimate the value of a flexible system and not operate it
optimally, if the strategic environments are not considered appropriately. The examples showing the importance of strategic environment are easily found in competitive
industries. Google paid 12.5 billion dollars to acquire Motorola in 2012, and sold
the company to Lenovo at 2.91 billion dollars except for the majority of Motorola’s
patents. After spending about 10 billion dollars, Google retains only Motorola’s
patents, and many of the patents has not been implemented yet. The retained patents
provide flexibility to Google, because customers’ demands are hard to predict. If the
patents enable Google to satisfy a new demand, the company is able to manage the
stochastic environment which comes from customers’ volatile demands. However,
whether the patents are worth of 10 billion dollars is controversial. Samsung is one of
the biggest competitors against Google in the mobile phone market. Since Samsung
has been engaged in many patent infringement suits, it aggressively invests in the
research and development of alternative technologies. If Google underestimated the

4
R&D efforts of competitors, the deal with Motorola regarding the patents could be
overestimated.
The strategic environments affect not only the evaluation of a flexible system but
also the operation of it. In the context of launching a new product without competition, a company may want to postpone introducing the new product to utilize the
benefits from the existing production line. Suppose that the workers are so accustomed to the current production process that the company saves costs by learning
curve effect, and the new product may encroach on the profit of the current product. Then the company has incentive to postpone launching a new product until the
customers’ demand of the existing product is exhausted. Alternatively, presume that
the market is competitive, and the first mover’s advantage exists. Then the company
has incentive to preoccupy the new product market by introducing the new product
earlier than its competitor, even if it costs the benefit from the current production
mode. In terms of flexible system management, it suggests the competition hasten
the execution time of flexible option.
This research is motivated to develop an concrete framework for an optimal design
of a flexible system that has exercise delay and to derive and analyze the equilibrium
of interactions between decision makers who operate flexible systems.

1.2

Overview of Research Goals
The primary objectives of this dissertation are to develop a concrete framework of

flexible system design considering exercise delay and to analyze the rational behavior
of system operators who manage a flexible system and interact with each other. The
increasing attention that has been directed toward managing the impact of uncertainties in flexible systems with exercise delay has not yet provided a framework for the
system design problem. It is a cornerstone of design task how the designed flexible
system is operated, and the operational decision is based on the designed features.
To the best of author’s knowledge, the current literature has not yet provided a sys-
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tematic framework for the design problem considering the interdependency of design
and operational level decision. Providing a well-established flexible system design
framework is one of the main goals of this dissertation.
Strategic environments compel a decision maker to consider both the uncertainty
that is not controlled by any of decision makers and the risk caused by other players.
Considering the endogenous interdependency among decision makers and investigating decision makers’ rational behavior in an equilibrium are the other main goals of
this research effort.
These research goals are accomplished through the development of the theoretical
models of a flexible system and the solutions under stochastic environments and
strategic environments.

1.2.1

Flexible System with Exercising Delay

This research considers an irreversible decision under a stochastic environment.
A system designer builds a flexible system that enables the operator of the system to
postpone the irreversible decision until the uncertainty is resolved enough to ensure
the irreversible decision is effective. This dissertation postulates there is an exercise
delay between the decision and implementation of the flexible alternative, and once
the decision is made, it cannot be revoked. Since the traditional approach is not
adequate in this situation, this research effort utilizes the findings in optimal control
theory and develops a systematic framework for designing the flexible system.
This research provides the following benefits to the flexible system managements
regarding exercise delay as the measure of flexibility under stochastic environments.
• Deriving the optimal operational policy of a flexible system with exercise delay:
A comprehensive profile of optimal operational policies according to the parameters those represent market conditions and the flexible system configurations
is beneficial to system operators.
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• Analyzing the effect of exercise delay on the optimal operational policy: During
the exercise delay, the system is exposed to additional uncertainty which is
avoidable when there is no exercise delay. Therefore the exercise delay affects
the optimal operational decision. Analyzing the effect, this research aims to
provide insights into the characteristics of a flexible system design problem.
• Developing a concrete method to find the optimal design of a flexible system:
By investigating the mutual effects between design and operations, this research
effort elucidates the structure of design problem and suggests an appropriate
approach to solve the design problem. The suggested framework for design
problem is desirable to be solved with usual non-linear optimization methods.
To achieve these research goals, Chapter 3 of this dissertation develops theoretical
models and illustrative examples for two distinctive flexible systems. The model in
Section 3.3 considers only one flexible alternative is available for a flexible system
in terms of capability. It postulates that the operational task is to determine the
optimal time to initiate the change of system, and the design task is to embed the
optimal exercise delay into the flexible system. Section 3.4 models a flexible system
whose exercise delay and the level of capability change are determined in the design
phase.

1.2.2

Strategic Flexibility

This research expands the assumption of stochastic environments to strategic environments by including the interactions between decision makers. As the application
context, this research models a market share competition in a duopoly market where
the total market profit is stochastic. One player in the market retains an exclusive
patent, and the other player has to complete a research and development project to
compete with the player with patent in the new product market. Since this dissertation regards how fast a flexible system responds to the change of environment, the
developed model belongs to a stochastic preemption game.
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The results of this dissertation provide the following advantages to the flexible
system managements under strategic environments.
• Improving the construction of strategy space of option exercise games: For deterministic preemption games, how to describe the players strategy is well established with rigorous mathematical background [6]. However, it is still a
matter of study in stochastic preemption games. Reflecting the characteristics
of stochastic game, this research suggests the strategy space based on both the
history and the current position of stochastic factor.
• Finding the open loop equilibrium of strategic flexibility: In the open loop model,
players cannot observe their opponents’ actions during the game [7]. Therefore
no player updates his or her strategy after the beginning of the game. By deriving the equilibrium of the model, the rational behavior of the players provides
insight to the management of flexible system. Moreover, the equilibrium of this
model illustrates how the patent plays a role as a entrance barrier when the
information about the competitors’ behavior is restricted.
• Finding the closed loop equilibrium of strategic flexibility: In the closed loop
model, players are able to observe their competitors’ actions and to update
their own strategies based on the observed actions [7]. Although a comprehensive and concise description of players’ strategy is required to derive closed loop
equilibrium, a satisfactory construction of the strategy space is not yet reported
for stochastic preemption games. This research aims to provide a strategy space
that describes the players’ strategy appropriately, and to derive the closed loop
equilibrium illustrating the rational behavior of the players under the closed loop
information structure. Finding insights into the rational decisions by comparing the open loop equilibrium and the closed loop equilibrium is an additional
purpose of this research effort.
Chapter 4 is devoted to accomplishing these research objectives. Section 4.3 models the duopoly market share competition, where a player operates a flexible system
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without exercise delay, and the other player manages a flexible system with a fixed
exercise delay. The model in Section 4.4 considers the competition where the exercise
delay is a random variable.

1.3

Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the

research conducted in the area of flexibility. This chapter emphasizes the evolution of
flexibility concept, measure of flexibility, evaluation methods and strategic flexibility.
Chapter 3 introduces two models of flexible systems with exercise delay, and provides the optimal solutions of operational decisions and frameworks for system design
problems. The first model assumes that there is only one alternative in terms of
the level of capability change, and this assumption is relaxed in the second model to
accommodate an infinitely many alternatives case. The results of this chapter provide the closed form solution of the operational level problem that covers the cases of
expanding capability, reducing capability and even terminating the operation. Based
on the analytical solution, the effect of exercise delay upon the optimal operational
decision is analyzed. Moreover, the results clarify a structure of design problem and
indicate the difficulties of design problem caused by the interdependence between design and operational level decisions. A decomposition method is developed to solve
the design problem with usual non-linear optimization methods. Illustrative examples
in the context of a renewable energy utility are included .
Chapter 4 investigates the strategic flexibility in the context of duopoly market
share competition. This chapter assumes a company in the market retains an exclusive
patent and the other has to conduct Research and Development (R&D) project to
compete against the firm with the patent. This research models the exclusive patent
as a flexibility without exercise delay and R&D opportunity as that with exercise
delay. The first model assumes that the duration and costs of R&D are known
as fixed numbers, and the second model considers a stochastic duration and costs
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case. By deriving the open loop and closed loop equilibria and comparing them,
this dissertation provides insights into the rational behaviors of option exercise game
players.
This dissertation is concluded in Chapter 5 by presenting conclusions, research
contributions and potential extension areas for future research. The author provides
appendices containing the proofs of theorems, detailed calculations, numerical solutions of illustrative examples. The bibliography of referenced work is at the end of
this dissertation.
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2. RELATED WORK
2.1

The Concept of Flexibility
Research in the area of flexibility has over 70 years of history. Stigler [8] pub-

lished the seminal paper which explicitly used the terminology “flexibility.” In the
research, Stigler regarded a system having a flat average cost curve as a flexible
system. Marschak and Nelson [9] disputed the concept of flexibility suggested by
Stigler. They conceptualized flexibility in terms of marginal cost rather than average
cost. Hart [10] emphasized decision postponement as the core component of flexibility. With flexibility, a decision maker can postpone an irreversible decision until
future uncertainty is resolved enough. Feibleman and Friend [11] defined flexibility in
an organization context as “the capacity of an organization to suffer limited change,
without severe disorganization.”
In fact, flexibility is so important that there are entire journals and several excellent literature reviews devoted to the subject; however the concept of flexibility is
still vague and ambiguous. Buzacott and Mandelbaum stated the following in their
recent review paper [3]:
“As exciting and useful as the concept of ‘flexibility’ seems, there is no
common agreement on how to define or implement the concept and it has
been very problematic to get coordination between theoretical academic
understanding of flexibility and industrial practice.”
Saleh et al. [4] pointed out that one source of ambiguity is due to confusion
among similar terminologies such as robustness, adaptability and agility. Even though
the discussion is restricted to flexibility, the ambiguity does not disappear because
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flexibility concept highly depends on particular managerial situations or context of
the system [12].
To elucidate the concept of flexibility, Section 2.1.1 provides the conceptual development in the manufacturing area. Manufacturing flexibility is an extensively studied
area of flexibility thanks to the concrete flexible systems, such as flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), group technology and modular manufacturing. The findings in
manufacturing flexibility provide a theoretical benchmark to other areas. In the early
conceptual studies of manufacturing flexibility, identifying the types of flexibility to
improve manufacturing flexibility was the main subject of study.
Later research focused on abstracting the dimensions of flexibility from the identified types of flexibility. Since the flexibility dimension framework is applicable to
other areas, it extended to other areas, such as intellectual technology, supply chain,
and business process. Section 2.1.2 summarizes the dimensions found in the manufacturing context and the extended dimensions in other fields.

2.1.1

Types of Flexibility in Manufacturing Flexibility

Browne et al. [13] established the taxonomy of 8 flexibility types, and many following conceptual studies in manufacturing flexibility accept the types of flexibility
approach. Among the review papers, Sethi and Sethi [14] is often cited. By reviewing over 202 research articles, they provided 3 levels of flexibility: component
or basic flexibilities, system flexibilities, and aggregate flexibilities, and defined 11
flexibilities. Vokurka and O’Leary-Kelly [15] improved Sethi and Sethi’s framework
including empirical research. They defined 15 types of flexibility and identified four
important exogenous variables of manufacturing flexibility; strategies, organizational
attributes, technology and environmental factors. Other review papers, such as Gupta
and Goyal [16], Sarker et al. [17] De Toni and Tonchia [18], Shewchuk and Moodie [19],
Parker and Wirth [20], Beach et al. [21] and Bengtsson [22], and Koste et al. [23] ac-
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cepted the types of flexibility analysis. The author summarizes the widely accepted
definitions of flexibility types and the studies supporting the importance of the type.
1. Machine Flexibility: When a machine can complete various types of operations
the machine is flexible. Lim [24] studied machine flexibility with FMS designs
with empirical data. The research found two bottle neck processes of machine
flexibility; automated fixture assembly and mounting. Jaikumar [25] researched
how to improve machine flexibility in group technologies.
2. Material Handling Flexibility: If materials, such as raw materials and parts,
can be placed in proper positions efficiently, the system has material handling
flexibility. Gupta and Somers [2] asserted that there are three activities, loading
and unloading of parts, inter-machine transportation, and storage of parts, to
improve material handling flexibility. Material handling flexibility improves
machine usage and process efficiency.
3. Operation Flexibility: Operation flexibility means the ability to produce a product in various ways. This definition is provided in Browne et al. [13], and Sethi
and Sethi [14]. Modular process with standardized components is a typical
example of operational flexible system [26].
4. Automation Flexibility: Automated or computerized manufacturing systems
are flexible, since the manufacturing process can react to the realization of
uncertainty easily. Parthasarthy and Sethi [27] defined intensity of flexible automation, and analyzed its relationship with the performance of the manufacturing system. The empirical studies showed that flexible thinking is required
at strategic level. Gebauer and Scharl [28] studied automation flexibility in the
context of web business process.
5. Labor Flexibility: Vokuka and O’Leary-Kelly [15] defined labor flexibility as
“the range of tasks that an operator can perform within the manufacturing
system.” Labor flexibility is emphasized in the series of Slack’s studies [29–31].
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Gerwin [32] studied the labor flexibility in the context of computer-aided manufacturing. He also emphasized the worker’s skill on general purpose machines
over specialized equipment. Parthasarthy and Sethi [27] found that flexible automated manufacturing system requires more skillful workers and that project
team is an appropriate organization of flexible automation.
6. Part-Mix Flexibility: If a system is able to produce the set of parts without
major modifications, the system is part-mix flexible. Although Sethi and Sethi
called this flexibility “process flexibility,” this dissertation uses the candid terminology, part-mix flexibility, because process flexibility has a broader meaning
in recent research [33, 34]. Avonts and Van Wassenhove [35] clarified the concept of part-mix flexibility in flexible manufacturing system (FMS) context, and
modeled FMS decision making problem as a queuing network problem. Gerwin [36] introduced a similar concept, mix flexibility, as “The processing at any
one time of a mix of different parts loosely related to each other.” Tomlin and
Wang [37] studied supply chain design problem as a mix flexibility optimization
problem. They compared performances of four types of system; Single-source
dedicated, Single-source flexible, Dual-source dedicated and Dual-source flexible
systems.
7. Routing Flexibility: When a system has routing flexibility, the system can produce a part with various routes. Vokuka and O’Leary-Kelly [15] defined the
routing flexibility as “the number of alternative paths a part can take through
the system in order to be completed.” These flexibility definitions concur with
the definitions of Browne et al. [13] and Gerwin [36]. Rossi and Dini [38] investigated job-shop scheduling of systems with routing flexibility. They used an ant
colony optimization method to utilize the routing flexible system and showed
that the proposed algorithm is superior to genetic algorithm. Caprihan and
Wadhwa [39] studied the performance of a flexible manufacturing system with
routing flexibility with simulation. They found that increasing routing flexibil-
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ity does not guarantee the improvement of performance. This result implied
that there exists an optimal level of flexibility.
8. Product Flexibility: When existing parts of a system can be replaced with
new parts without spending significant amounts of time and costs, the system
has product flexibility. Gerwin and Tarondeau [40] refers product flexibility to
changeover and modification flexibility, and asserted that firms can response to
change of customers’ volatile preferences with the flexibility. Palani et al. [41]
supported the results of [40] with empirical findings.
9. Design Flexibility: With design flexibility, a system is able to introduce a new
product with short amount of time and low costs. Robb Dixon [42] emphasized introducing new product with empirical research. Kouvelis et al. [43] and
Kouvelis [44] focused on long-term problems in flexible manufacturing systems
such as design and planning problems. They classified the problems in terms of
decision level and planning horizons such as long term, medium term and short
term. Palani et al. [41] found that modularization, especially designing module,
enhances product flexibility.
10. Delivery Flexibility: Slack [31] defined delivery flexibility as “the extent to which
delivery dates can be brought forward” and “the time taken to reorganize the
manufacturing system so as to replan for the new delivery date.” Vokuka and
O’Leary-Kelly [15] interpreted Slack’s definition as “the ability of the system to
respond to changes in delivery requests.” Sabri and Beamon [45] analyzed the
effect of delivery flexibility on supply chain.
11. Volume Flexibility: Volume flexibility is the ability to adjust output levels according to the change of environment. Vokuka and O’Leary-Kelly [15] defined
the measure of volume flexibility as “the Range of output levels that a firm can
economically produce products.” Jack and Raturi [46] conducted three case
studies, and found the drivers and sources of volume flexibility. They classified the sources of volume flexibility into four categories; internal, external,
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short-term and long-term sources. The results showed that volume flexibility
increases financial performance and delivery performance of firms. Short term
sources and internal long-term sources were verified as the sources of volume
flexibility through statistical analysis.
12. Expansion Flexibility: If the capacity of a manufacturing system is able to be
adjusted easily, the manufacturing system has expansion flexibility. Gupta and
Somers [2] defined expansion flexibility as “the extent of overall effort needed
to increase the capacity.” Karsak and Özogul [47, 48] evaluated the value of
expansion flexibility based on a real option approach.
13. Program Flexibility: Sethi and Sethi [14] defined program flexibility as “the
ability of the system to run virtually untended for a long enough period,” and
Vokuka and O’Leary-Kelly [15] stated that “program flexibility reduces the
overall manufacturing time by decreasing set-up times.” Gupta and Somers [2]
verified the importance of program flexibility by factor analysis on data from
top level managers.
14. Production Flexibility: When a manufacturing system can produce a new product without adding major capital equipment, the system is production flexible.
Gupta and Somers [2] found three factors of determining production flexibility; variety and versatility of available machines, flexibility of material handling
systems, and the factory information and control systems.
15. Market Flexibility: Market flexibility is a broad concept of flexibility. Sethi
and Sethi [14] defined it as “the ease with which the manufacturing system can
adapt to a changing market environment.” This flexibility enables the firm to
cope with volatile environments and competitors’ behavior [2].
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2.1.2

Dimensions of Flexibility

Researchers have abstracted the essence of the types of flexibility. The dimensions
of manufacturing flexibility provided broader understanding about flexibility rather
than focusing on concrete activities. Since the dimensions of manufacturing flexibility
are generally applicable, the research of flexibility in other fields employed flexibility
dimension analysis.
Recently, Buzacott and Mandelbaum provided am exemplary literature review,
including a comprehensive framework for understanding flexibility, and emphasized
dimensions of flexibility [3, Section 2.4]. Parker and Wirth [20] suggested the relationships between types and dimensions of manufacturing flexibility. They analyzed
manufacturing flexibility with six categories; system vs. machine, action vs. state,
static vs. dynamic, range vs. response, potential vs. actual, and short, medium and
long term. Shewchuk and Moodie [19] employed a part of the dimensions in their
classification.
The research of flexibility dimension analysis has been extended to other fields
such as information technology, business process and supply chain management. As
a consequence of extension, interdisciplinary study about flexibility has been conducted. Golden and Powell’s work [49] is a survey paper of flexibility in information
technology field. Schonenberg et al. [34] reviewed flexibility studies in the view point
of business process. Saleh et al.’s work provides an interdisciplinary literature review
for flexibility [50].
1. Level of flexibility: Gerwin [36] mentioned the level of flexibility, and it is improved in his following work [51]. Suri and Whitney [52] and Kouvelis [44]
classified the level of flexibility into three levels. The top level decision is called
strategic decisions, and it contains the decisions about part family selection and
system capacity. The second level decision includes batching and resource allocation decisions. Scheduling, dispatching, tool management and system monitoring decisions belong to the third decision level. Sethi and Sethi [14] provided
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three levels of flexibility in their framework of flexibility; component or basic,
system, and aggregate flexibility. Component or basic level flexibility includes
machine, material handling, and operation flexibility. System flexibilities consist of process, routing, product, volume and expansion flexibility. Gupta [53]
classified flexibility according to the magnitude of changes that flexible choice
provides. He asserted machine, cell, plant and corporate levels of flexibility.
De Toni and Tonchia [18] emphasized vertical or hierarchical classification of
flexibility and summarized the studies related to the level of flexibility. They
analyzed flexibility in four levels; plant and machine, production function and
work department level, product line level and global level of the firm. Parker
and Wirth [20] call this dimension as system vs. machine dimension. Buzacott
and Mandelbaum [3] stated that the level of flexibility defines the boundary of
decision problems and systems.
In supply chain management, the level of flexibility is extended beyond the firm’s
level. Mair [54] added the corporation’s network level of flexibility to micro
level and factory level by studying Honda’s case. Stevenson and Spring [55]
also emphasized the network, outside of a firm level dimension, as a dimension
of flexibility. Although Parker and Wirth [20] called this dimension the system
vs. machine dimension, the research of supply chain management field suggest
“level of flexibility” is more appropriate name of this dimension. Therefore, this
dissertation calls it level of flexibility.
2. Prior, Action, and State Flexibility: Buzacott and Mandelbaum [3, Chapter 2]
provided the definitions of prior, action and state flexibility as following.
• Prior Flexibility: The variety of initial actions or decisions that decision
makers can take
• State Flexibility: The system with state flexibility is able to manage exogenous uncertainty by being effective under any environmental outcome
and thus coping with the stochastic environmental change. Suppose that
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an alternative is effective for one environment and is not effective for all
the others, than the alternative is state inflexible. On the other hand, if a
choice is effective for many situations, it is state flexible.
• Action Flexibility: The system equipped with action flexibility is able to
respond to resolved uncertainty by taking effective recourse action.
3. Decision Epoch: Carlsson [56] stated that “Static flexibility refers to the ability
to deal with foreseeable changes (i.e., risk), such as fluctuations in breakdowns
in the production process” and “dynamic flexibility refers to the ability to deal
with uncertainty in the form of unpredictable events, such as new ideas, new
products, new types of competitors, etc.” For dynamic flexibility, Buzacott
and Mandelbaum distinguish two periods cases and continuous time cases [3,
Section 2.4.6]. Two periods decision making problem is the simplest case of
finite decision epoch. Therefore this dissertation suggests four decision epochs;
single, finite, countable and continuous decision epoch.
4. Range and Response: Slack [30] recommended decision makers analyze flexibility in terms of range and response dimensions. Range of flexibility refers to the
extent of alternatives that a decision maker can choose. On the other hand,
response of flexibility expresses how fast the alternative can be implemented.
Buzacott and Mandelbaum include this dimension in “ease of change” [3, Section 2.4.3].
5. Potential and Actual Flexibility: Browne et al. [13] discussed the dimensions of
potential and actual flexibility. Potential flexibility means the flexibility which
exists but is utilized only when it is needed. Actual flexibility refers to the
flexibility which is utilized regardless of the environmental status.
6. Decision Horizon: Gershwin et al. [57] provided three levels of decision horizon
as following;
• Long Term: Investment and initial design decisions
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• Medium Term: Design and planning decisions
• Short Term: Real time control
Gupta and Buzacott [58] decomposed “changes” with time scale according to
Gershwin’s decision horizon.
7. Uncertainty: Groote [59] suggested a general framework about the flexibility
of production processes. The research asserted three main properties of flexibility in terms of environment allocation, operations strategy and strategic
interfaces. Especially, it classified the application area by the number of uncertainty, one-dimensional applications and multidimensional applications. Buzacott and Mandelbaum stated not only the property of uncertainty but also the
interaction among decision makers [3, Section 2.4.4]. They emphasized that
interaction has different characteristics from exogenous uncertainty. Exogenous
uncertainty is not influenced by a decision maker’s decision. However, when
there is interaction, a decision maker’s decision affects the environment.

2.2

The Measure of Flexibility
The measure of flexibility represents how much a system is flexible. It is not sur-

prising that the measure of flexibility is not clear either, since the concept of flexibility
has not matured yet. While various measures of flexibility have been suggested, they
can be classified into four categories; the amount of cost to change, the number of
feasible alternatives, the extent of uncertain states in that the purpose of system is
achieved, and others.
The first approach asserts that the cost to accomplish the desired change measures
the flexibility of system. For example, Gupta and Somers [2] measures expansion
flexibility with the overall cost to increase system’s capacity. When the alternatives
of flexible systems are fixed, the cost base approach is appropriate. However, it is
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not sufficient to measure flexibility with only the cost to accomplish the change when
there are a number of possible choices.
The second approach measures flexibility with the extent of possible choices. For
instance, Mandelbaum and Buzacott [60] suggests the remaining choices available in
the subsequent period as the measure of flexibility in the context of decision theory.
This approach has disadvantages that useless alternatives are counted in measuring
flexibility. If a choice would be never used, the alternative does not contribute to
enhance the performance of the flexible system.
The third measure of flexibility is based on the states that a flexible system is
efficient. Gupta and Rosenhead [61], which is believed the first research to provide
the measure of flexibility [50], mentioned the following:
Rather than try to identify the best alternatives, we can ensure that our
early investment decisions permit the achievement of as many end-states
as possible. Subsequent stages of the investment plan are left to be determined at later dates, when more recent information is available · · · . In
the context of our discussion, flexibility of a decision must be measured in
terms of the number of end states which remain as open options. [61, Page
B20-B21].
Subsequent studies support the open state based approach, since it provides useful
insight to the value of flexibility [50].
The entropy of flexible systems is suggested as a measure of flexibility [16, 62,
63]. According to Kumar [62], this measure has firm axiomatic foundations. The
properties and potential of entropy based measure is still the subject of study.

2.3

The Value of Flexibility
Various methods for valuing flexible systems have been developed. The most pop-

ular approach is the real options approach. Since flexibility has similar properties
as financial options, researchers employ the findings in financial options to evaluate
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flexibility. This is called the real options approach. Other than the real options approach, a number of methods are able to assess the value of flexibility according to the
context, for instance, dynamic programming, optimal control theory and expanded
net present value methods. Because of the variety of the methods, this dissertation
focuses on the important dimensions of the value of flexibility rather than the concrete
valuation methods.

2.3.1

Real Options Approach

Real options approach is the application of financial option theory to non-financial
investments. Financial options are basically contingent claims that can be made only
if attractive outcomes occur. Because flexible decision making and financial options
have this similarity, the methods to evaluate financial options are applicable to valuing
flexible system. Financial options theory is an extensive field, including the Nobel
Prize winning contributions of Black and Scholes [64] and Merton [65]. They derived
a closed-form solution to the value of a European call option. This method extended
to real assets which have similar properties with the European options [66]. Dixit and
Pindyck [1] and Trigeorgis [67] provided well-structured accounts of both the theory
and applications of real options. Bengtsson [22] reviewed flexibility and real options,
based on the classification of Sethi and Sethi [14] and investigated the ability of
real options methodologies to model flexibilities such as routing, volume, expansion,
shut-down, abandonment and deferment.
Before examining specific real options approachs to flexibility, the author remarks
that two critical assumptions of financial options theory should be carefully treated
in applying the results to real decision problems. The assumptions are the risk attitude of the decision-maker and the completeness of markets. In the financial realm,
risk preferences can often be ignored via market completeness, however, in general
decision environments, outcomes cannot be replicated with tradable assets, and risk
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preferences must be taken into account [1]. The comparable assumptions of flexibility
evaluation are risk neutral decision makers and known payoff functions.
1. Option to Defer: Real option provides rights to wait until future uncertainty
is resolved enough to make an appropriate decision. Tiltman [68] applied real
option theory to pricing and deciding the optimal time to develop vacant urban land. Ingersoll and Ross [69] pointed out that most of investment projects
have similar properties with financial options, and the value of waiting to invest can be found through option valuation models. McDonald and Siegel [70]
investigated the optimal timing to invest an irreversible project when the value
of project follows a continuous stochastic process, geometric Brownian motion.
They derived the closed form solution of the optimal timing and the value of
project.
2. Time-to-Build: When a project includes multiple stages, the option theory is
applicable to each stage. Majd and Pindyck [71] studied staged construction
investments with adjustments in response to resolved uncertainty by considering the effects of the time-to-build and opportunity cost on the investment
decision. Carr [72] researched sequential exchange opportunities using option
pricing theory.
3. Option to Alter Operating Scale: If the facing uncertainty turns to be favorable, the firm can expand the volume of production. On the contrary, if the
environment of the firm is hostile, the firm can shut down or contract the operation. Brennan and Schwartz [73] evaluated a flexibility copper mine system
applying real option theory. They found the optimal policies to develop operate
and abandon the mine considering fluctuating copper price which follows geometric Brownian motion. Trigeorgis and Mason [74] and Pindyck [75] are other
examples which belong to this category of real option.
4. Option to Abandon: If the environment is extremely unfavorable, a decision
maker can abandon an ongoing project permanently. The value of a project
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which can be abandoned and the optimal time of abandonment are the main
subjects of option to abandon. McDonald and Siegel [76] analyzed the value
of abandon option under the assumption of geometric Brownian motion. They
considered risk-neutral and risk-averse decision makers, and conducted sensitivity analysis of the optimal policy and the value of option. Myers and Majd [77]
caught the similarity between the option to abandon and American put option on a stock which pays dividend. Using an American put option evaluation
method, they found the value of option to abandon and optimal strategy to
exercise abandonment option.
5. Option to Switch: If a firm has product mix flexibility or process flexibility,
managers of the firm can change the current state of the firm to another available
state. Kulatilaka [78] modeled a flexible industrial steam boiler which can choose
its fuel between oil and natural gas. Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [79] developed a
general framework to evaluate switch option.

2.3.2

Dimensions of Valuing Flexibility

Other than real options approach, Ross et al. [80] presented a framework for
defining the “changeability” of a system, which encompasses flexibility, adaptability,
scalability, and robustness. Ross et al. present their framework as a basis for design,
analysis, and evaluation of engineered systems. While the emphasis of this literature
has surrounded defining, measuring, and best practices for designing flexible systems [81], there is comparatively little work on techniques for valuing flexibility, and
their assumptions, trade-offs, and abilities. Notable works in this area include [82–84].
Neely [82] and Nilchiani and Hastings [83] approached the valuation problem from
different domains, such as R&D and space systems, but each consider net present
value, decision analysis and real options as approaches for valuing projects and systems. They arrived at similar conclusions that the classification of uncertainty can
differentiate systems by which approaches are most appropriate. These works com-
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monly point out there are system characteristics affecting the evaluation methods.
The author recapitulates the important dimensions of evaluating flexibility.
1. The Number of Decision Epochs: In the simplest case, there is a single point
in time when a decision can be made, for example, European style financial options. In this case, closed-form solutions for the value of the flexibility are often
available. For example, when the value of the optional asset follows the lognormal distribution and other standard market assumptions hold, the BlackScholes formulas give the value of the option. More generally, there may be
multiple, but finitely many decision epochs. This is the case for systems with
recurring decision opportunities and fixed lifespans. If the life of the system is
indefinite or approximately infinite, a system with discrete decision epochs can
be modeled as having countably many epochs. In the extreme, systems can be
modeled with uncountably many decision epochs if decisions can be made continuously. In financial options applications, distinctions between the numbers
of decision epochs can clearly be seen in the distinctions between European,
Bermudan, and American style options. In general, systems with more decision
epochs require more sophisticated formulations.
2. The Number of Alternatives: By definition, any decision epoch has at least two
alternatives. Systems with minimal flexibility, two alternatives at exactly one
decision epoch, are rarely encountered in reality, and are structurally equivalent to European-style financial options. Although it is often the case, or
assumed for convenience, systems need not have the same number of alternatives per decision epoch. Systems with just two alternatives per epoch are
often well-behaved, with state thresholds delineating optimality regions for the
two alternatives. Operational decisions with a range of discrete or continuous
alternatives, e.g., inventory management of a continuous commodity can have
finitely many, countably many, or uncountably many alternatives per epoch. As
the number of alternatives per decision epoch increases, there is greater need to
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express the relationship between the costs, benefits, and constraints of the system and the alternatives through mathematical functions. Ceteris paribus, the
value of flexibility is always non-decreasing in the number of total alternatives
the system operator faces over the lifespan of the system. Generally speaking,
as the number of alternatives increases, solving for the optimal operational or
control strategies becomes increasingly difficult.
3. The Characterization of Uncertainty: The underlying uncertainty plays an important role in the modeling, formulation, and techniques which are appropriate
for valuing flexibility. Increasing the number of uncertain factors modeled significantly hampers the prospect of analytical solutions, and increases the computational burden of numerical and simulation-based solutions. The level of
precision needed to characterize uncertainty parallels the timing of the decision
epochs. There is no need to model the stochastic process of uncertain variables
at a greater level of detail than can be utilized by the decision-maker. When
detailed information on the stochastic process governing a random variable can
always be reduced to the so-called calibrating distribution of the random variable at the decision epochs analytically or numerically [85]. When limited information about uncertain variables is available, e.g., moments or data on the
distribution function, the maximum entropy principle can be used to estimate
the distribution of the uncertainty. When modeling uncertainties, the assumptions of stationarity (probabilities are invariant to time shifts) and independence
(multiple realizations of uncertainty provides no information about each other)
are assumptions that allow for stronger formulations and solution methods.
4. The Decision Maker’s Objective and Constraints: The typical decision maker’s
goals are to maintain a given capability while minimizing cost, maximize the
rewards from a fixed cost, or most generally, maximize the net value of benefits
less costs. Moreover, when there are constraints that limit the operation of a
flexible system, it affects the value of flexibility.
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2.4

Strategic Flexibility
Strategic flexibility is the intersection of game theory and traditional flexibility.

As Grenadier [86] pointed out the traditional real option paradigm is limited by not
enough consideration of strategic environment in which many decision makers interact
with each other. Integrating the knowledge of flexibility and game theory provide
more profound understanding about the behavior of real world decision makers.
There are two approaches to harmonize flexibility and game theory; option exercise
games and stochastic differential games. Option exercise games are based on the real
option approach extend to game theoretic modification. On the other hand, stochastic differential games are grounded on game theory, and extend to include stochastic
factors which are expressed with stochastic differential equations. Researchers in economics, business, and engineering fields mainly take option exercise games approach,
and applied mathematicians have contributed to stochastic differential games area.

2.4.1

Option Exercise Games

Huisman [87], Smit and Trigeorgis [88] and Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis [89]
provide a text book of option exercise games. Grenadier [90] edited selected papers
of option exercise games. Ferreira et al. [91] emphasized option exercise games is
an appropriate approach to analyze the competitive advantage in strategic stochastic
environment. This section will review option exercise games studies by subjects
1. Real Estate Investment: Real estate investment has important properties that
make strategic environments significant in decision making. Williams [92] asserted that real asset development has finite elasticity of demand, limited number of and capacities of developers and limited supply of investment opportunities. Therefore, real estate development is one of the popular application areas
of option exercise games. He derived a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium focusing on the limited supply of undeveloped real estate and finite elasticity of
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demand due to the limited number of developer. Grenadier [93] found optimal
investment time for real estate development and strategic equilibrium.
2. Option to defer under competition: Smit and Ankun [94] considered the option
to defer investment in manufacturing under competition. They found that the
postponement of an investment decision may lose first mover’s advantage.
3. Strategic Growth: The exercise of options is an appropriate model to explain
strategic growth such as R&D, advertising campaigns, and logistical planning,
under competition. Since these activities can yield long term competitive advantages and growth opportunities, those are called strategic growth options.
Loury [95] is the seminal paper in strategic growth subject, R&D investment
with competition. Kulatilaka and Perotti [96] studied the optimal decision of
strategic growth under imperfect competition. Joaquin and Butler [97, Chapter
16] developed a strategic investment model when one firm has a competitive
advantage thanks to an asymmetric cost structure. They derived an optimal
exercising strategy of output level and timing and found a unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium under the assumption of duopoly market. Weeds [98] studied strategic growth option under two stochastic factors; the value of patent
and the probability of success of the project. Her results showed that there are
various optimal strategies according to the parameter values.
4. Incomplete Information and Preemption: When the competitors have incomplete information, the value of preemption, the first mover’s advantage, is not
the same to the case of complete information. Grenadier [99] studied the problem that each player behaves based on asymmetric private information, and
found an equilibrium framework. Interesting results include that if a player
chooses exercising policy based on the observed behavior of a competitor, a
“follow the leader” type of policy is optimal. Lambrecht and Perraudin [100]
investigated optimal strategies when there is a threat of competitor’s entry. The
information about a competitor’s entry is known with a probability distribution.
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5. Duopoly or Oligopoly Market Competition: Dias and Teixeira [101] reviewed
Smets [102]. He studied a stochastic symmetric duopoly problem. In his model,
an impact on market price follows geometric Brownian motion, and each firm
has an identical cost structure to its competitor. He found symmetric equilibrium of the market using dynamic programming approach with simplified assumption about production level. Joaquin and Buttler [97, Chapter 16] expand
Smets’s work into asymmetric duopoly market and derived mixed strategy theorem. Grenadier [86] derived the Nash equilibrium for a Cournot competition
where both of the players have symmetric payoff structures and information.
The results show that the payoff of each player is determined by the underlying
stochastic process and the strategies of the players.

2.4.2

Stochastic Differential Games

The researchers in the stochastic differential games field focus on the structure of
the problems and problem characteristics, such as pursuit evasion, zero sum games,
cooperative and non-cooperative games, rather than the application. Recently, Ramachandran and Tsokos [103] provided a book about stochastic differential games focusing on pursuit-evasion games, concept of solutions and solving techniques. Friesz
[104] and Dockner et al. [105] focused on the application of stochastic differential
games in economics and management context. Bardi et al. [106] and Cardaliaguet
and Cressman [107] dealt with technical methods, especially numerical method, for
solving stochastic differential games. Contrary to other books which focus on noncooperative games, Yeung and Petrosyan [108] provided a text book treat about
cooperative stochastic differential games. This section contains a brief review about
stochastic differential games with traditional research topics and solving technique
point of views.
Roxin and Tsokos [109] define stochastic differential games. According to the
definition, games are stochastic if there is noise in the players’ observations of the
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state of the system or the transition equation. Bardi and Gaghavan [106] reviewed
many aspects of differential games such as pursuit evasion games, zero-sum games,
cooperative and non-cooperative games and other types of dynamic games. Pursuit
Evasion games believed the first application area of stochastic differential games.
The seminal work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern [110] applied to pursuit evasion
problem [111] since 1954. Basar and Haurie [112], a problem of pursuit-evasion is
considered where the pursuer has perfect knowledge whereas the evader can only
make noisy measurements of the state of the game.
This dissertation is interested in the solution techniques which are developed
in stochastic differential games. In the early development of solving techniques of
stochastic differential games, it is believed that a control process where each player
choose the optimal control variable to accomplish his or her objective. However,
subsequent research showed that the optimal control approach is inappropriate to be
applied directly to solve stochastic differential games [111, 113].
Ho [114] solved a stochastic differential game problem with variational techniques.
Stimulated by [114], martingale approach and variational inequality approach were
popular in the 1970s. The existence and uniqueness of a solution was investigated by
many researchers, for example, Elliott [115], Bensoussan and Friedman [116].
A type of dynamic programming approach, Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Issacs (HJI) equation, was another widespread method to attack stochastic differential games. The
early works on differential games are based on the dynamic programming method now
called as Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Issacs (HJI) [117]. However, is an HJI equation may not
have smooth solutions, and existing non-smooth solutions may not be unique. Therefore, in 1980s viscosity solution, a generalized solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi equation,
emerged. If a HJI equation satisfies a class of boundary conditions, viscosity solution
represents the unique solution of the HJI equation. The notion of viscosity solution is also useful to show a convergence property of algorithms based on dynamic
programming [118, 119].
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3. FLEXIBLE SYSTEM WITH EXERCISE DELAY
3.1

Introduction
This research considers an irreversible decision under a stochastic environment.

This chapter postulates that a system designer builds a flexible system that enables
the operator of the system to postpone an irreversible change of system capability until
the underlying uncertainty is resolved enough to cope with a stochastic environment.
There exists “exercise delay” between the time the change is initiated and the time
that the change is completed. Since the operational decision is a premise of the design
problem, it is required to derive a comprehensive optimal solution of the operational
level decision. This research employs an optimal control theory that is based on
variational inequality approach to solve the operational level problem, and derives
a comprehensive closed form solution of operational level problem. Based on the
closed form solution, this research effort analyzes the effect of exercise delay on the
operational policy and identifies the interdependency of the operational task and
design task. Given the optimal operational decision, the system designer decides how
much flexibility, i.e., how long the exercise delay, is embedded in the flexible system.
The system design framework is developed upon the findings from operational
level decisions. Given the optimal operational decision, the system designer decides
how much flexibility, i.e., how long the exercise delay, is embedded in the flexible
system. The framework suggests that the design problem is decomposed into subproblems according to the effect of decided design variables on the operational level
decision. The developed framework is so concrete that the design level problem is
solvable with usual non-linear optimization methods with once differentiability cost
function.
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The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief review
of delayed flexible systems and design of flexible system design. Section 3.3 models
a delayed flexible system that has only one flexible alternative with respect to the
capability change. The operational task is to determine the optimal time to start the
change the system’s capability, and the design task is choosing the optimal exercise
delay. The operational problem and design problem are stated in Section 3.3.1. The
comprehensive description of the optimal operational policy is reported in Section
3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 provides the decomposition framework of design level problem
and an illustrative example to show the usefulness of the framework. Section 3.4
considers the case that the system designer decides both the length of exercise delay
and the level of capability change. The results in this section are reported with the
similar structure of previous section. This chapter ends with the summary in Section
3.5.

3.2

Literature Review

3.2.1

Flexible System with Exercise Delay

Review papers and conceptual studies about flexibility agree with the importance
of exercise delay. Buzacott and Mandelbaum [3] highlight exercise delay as a measure
of flexibility. Slack emphasizes system response, which is defined as “the ease with
which it moves from one state to another, in terms of cost, time or organizational
disruption” as a measure of flexibility [29–31].
This research leverages the relatively well-developed literature devoted to the optimal operation or control of a flexible system. Bar-Ilan and Strange [120] delivered
a seminal research article in this area. They consider the case when the recourse
decision can be abandoned during the delay, and find that the option of abandonment can make option exercise time early. Other extensions dealing with delayed
options or delayed stopping problems include Alvarez and Keppo [121], who consider
the case where delivery lags and revenues are correlated; Bayraktar and Egami [122],
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who provide a constructive solution and model the magnitude of the option decision; and Sødal [123], who considers extensions such as multi-agent systems. Applications of these and similar models include mergers and acquisitions [124], power
generation [125, 126], and the decision to implement advanced manufacturing equipment [127]. Relative to the existing results in the literature, primary contributions
of this research are the measurement of flexibility in terms of the exercise delay, and
the modeling and solution of the system design problem.
Optimal stopping problems are a classic formulation from the operations research
and real options communities, where dynamic programming [1] and variational inequality approaches [128] are two common solution approaches. The operation of
a flexible system with a single irreversible decision can be modeled as an optimal
stopping problem, where the typical solution to the control problem is a threshold
policy which delineates between exercise and continuation regions. The most general
approach for a flexible system with exercise delay is by modeling the optimal operation or control problem as a delayed optimal stopping time problem. Øksendal [129]
provides the method to convert a delayed optimal stopping time problem to a normal optimal stopping time problem without delay, under the assumption of strong
Markov property. Moreover, he delivers a rigorous method to solve a optimal stopping time problem, and this paper leverages these results to solve the system design
problem [128, Chapter 10].

3.2.2

Design of Flexible Systems

A number of studies devoted to study the optimal design of a flexible system.
Fine and Freund [130] studies the optimal investment in flexibility of a firm that can
distribute its capacity between two products. The uncertainty that the firm faced
was the quantity of demands described with discrete probability distributions. This
research addresses the optimal design of a prior flexibility. Van Mieghem [131] models
the optimal flexibility investment problem as a news-vendor problem with arbitrary
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multivariate demand distribution. The research finds the optimal investment policies
according to costs, prices and demand uncertainty. Bish and Wang [132] develop van
Mieghem’s work to the case that there are correlations among the uncertain amount
of demands. Research about partial flexibility provides significant insights into the
investment of flexibility.
Partial flexibility means that facilities can only produce a certain range of products. Jordan and Graves [33] provide important concepts, smart limited flexibility
and chaining. Smart limited flexibility means the appropriate limited flexibility provides most of the benefits of full flexibility. Moreover, chaining strategy, combination
of limited flexible facilities, enhances the performance of limited flexible systems. Jordan and Graves’ work [33] has been extended in many application areas; Graves and
Tomlin [133] extend the result in multistage supply chains context; Gurumurthi and
Benjaafar [134] apply the result to queuing systems; Hopp et al. [135] apply the results for scheduling flexible workforce. The flexibility in a network context is also an
interesting research area in the systems flexibility point of view. Iravani et al. [136]
suggested structural flexibility that is the flexibility concept for serial, parallel, open
and closed networks. Based on network flow model, Akşin and Karaesmen [137]
showed that the throughput of a network is concave with respect to the level of
flexibility. Using the property, they studied the relationship between flexibility and
capacity. Chou et al. [138] studied the worst-case performance of a symmetric system,
and provided design guidelines. Although numerous studies are devoted to design of
flexible system, the author has not found the research considering the exercise delay
as a design variable, yet.

3.3

One Alternative Model

3.3.1

Model

This research considers a system with an infinite lifetime [0, ∞). Let (Ω, F, P) be
a complete probability space equipped with a filtration (Ft )t≥0 satisfying the usual
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conditions, and B(t) be a standard Brownian motion. The state variable, X(t),
represents the underlying uncertainty in the system environment, and is assumed to
follow a geometric Brownian motion with constant coefficients, i.e.,
dX(t) = µX(t)dt + σX(t)dB(t),

X(0) = x ∈ [0, ∞), t ∈ [0, ∞)

(3.1)

where µ ∈ R and σ ∈ [0, ∞) are the drift and volatility parameters. Geometric
Brownian motion is widely accepted to model underlying uncertainties of flexible
systems, such as a price process in a perfectly competitive market. Notice that the
stochastic differential equation (3.1) has a unique solution, and satisfies strong Markov
Property.
Suppose that the system operator has one opportunity to change from the current system to an alternative system, for example, by upgrading or downgrading
equipment. The current and alternative systems yield discounted linear profit rate of
e−ρt (a1 X(t) + b1 ) and e−ρt (a2 X(t) + b2 ), respectively. The parameters, a1 , a2 , b1 , b2 ,
and ρ, are given constants. The discount factor ρ is assumed to be positive and ρ > µ
to ensure existence of expected payoff. This setting can describe various system performances which is linear to underlying uncertainty. For example, in the context of
production, ai stands for the production levels of system i, and bi < 0 represents
manufacturing cost of system i, for i = 1, 2. In terms of real options, this model includes entry option with a1 = b1 = 0, exit option with a2 = b2 = 0, expansion option
with a1 < a2 , and downsizing option with a1 > a2 . For the sake of convenience, this
research refers to the case when the alternate system provides less variable yield than
the initial system (a1 > a2 ) as a downgrade, and the opposite case (a1 < a2 ) as a upgrade. To avoid trivial solutions, this research assumes that a1 6= a2 . For notational
simplicity, let θ = {µ, σ, ρ, a1 , a2 , b1 , b2 } represent the full set of parameters.
When the system operator decides to change the system at time τ , there is a delay
δ until the alternative system takes effect at time τ + δ. During the exercise delay the
system is assumed to continue the initial yield mode. Moreover, the author assumes
that there exists only one opportunity to change the system. According to the results
of [129], the operational level problem with multiple opportunities can be solved
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by iterative application of the method that this research employs. Therefore, this
assumption does not undermine the value of this research but assist to focus on the
design level problem. Making the decision to change to the alternative system incurs
the cost (c̃(δ) < 0) or revenue (c̃(δ) > 0); this study models the one-time cash flow
as occurring at the time when the transformation is completed, τ + δ. Upgrading the
system would typically incur a cost, whereas downgrading the system may produce
revenue through the sale of equipment. At this point, the system operators control
problem can be formulated. The operational performance function, j(x, τ |δ), and the
operational value function, v(x, δ) can be written as

 R
τ +δ −ρt
−ρ(τ +δ)
e
(a
X(t)
+
b
)dt
+
e
c̃(δ)
1
1

j(x, τ |δ) = E  0
R ∞ −ρt
+ τ +δ e (a2 X(t) + b2 )dt
v(x, δ) = sup j(x, τ |δ)

(3.2)
(3.3)

τ ∈[0,∞)

where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability law of X(t) starting
at X(0) = x. The operational level problem is for the system operator to determine
the optimal time, τ ∗ to exercise the option.
At the design level, the system designer builds the system with optimal delay, δ ∗ ,
considering the costs of designing, acquiring, and constructing a system, given that
system will be operated optimally. The possible choice set of δ is [δmin , δmax ] where
0 ≤ δmin ≤ δmax < ∞. The initial cost of designing and building the flexible system is
C(δ). Then the value of optimally designed flexible system under optimal operational
control becomes
V (x) =

sup

[v(x, δ) − C(δ)]

(3.4)

δ∈[δmin ,δmax ]

One additional assumption is that the system designer and operator have the same
objective functions, and therefore any principal-agent scenarios requiring incentives
is not a subject of this research. This research now turns to analyzing this model in
order to derive optimal control and design policies.
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3.3.2

Operational Level Decision

Optimal Operational Policy
The operational control problem of this flexible system is a delayed optimal stopping time problem. The results of [129] show how to transform this problem into an
optimal stopping time problem without delay based on the strong Markov condition.
In general, the optimal control policy is a threshold policy where the continuation region is either below the threshold when the alternative system is an upgrade or above
the threshold when the alternative system is a downgrade [1, pp.128-130]. However, based on system parameters, the decision to exercise the option could be made
immediately, when the state variable crosses an optimal threshold, or never. The
combinations of parameters which determine the boundaries of the optimal policies
are described in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.1 The solution of operational problem (3.2) and (3.3) is summarized
in Table 3.1.
Proof in Appendix A.1
The first three rows of Table 3.1 correspond to the upgrade case. Here the solution
yields two cases, when it is desirable to exercise the option immediately, and when
it is optimal to stay in the current system until the state variable rises above a
threshold. The second three rows of Table 3.1 correspond to the downgrade case.
Here the solution yields three cases, where the option is never desirable, immediately
desirable, and desirable once the state variable falls below an optimal threshold. The
reason there is no set of parameters within the upgrade case which produce a solution
to never exercise the option is that the state variable X(t) is not bounded above,
and therefore the greater variable yield from the alternate system can always become
great enough to compensate for the exercise costs as well as possibly greater system
fixed operation costs. It can easily be verified that when the state variable is exactly
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Table 3.1
Optimal Operational Policy and Operational Value
x, θ

c̃(δ) <
a1 < a2

a1 > a2

b1 −b2
ρ

Optimal Operational Policy

0 ≤ x < x∗1 (δ)
x∗1 (δ) ≤ x

Continue in current mode until

τ1∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|x ≥ x∗1 (δ)}

vc,1 (x, δ)

Exercise the option immediately

v0 (x, δ)

c̃(δ) ≥

b1 −b2
ρ

Exercise the option immediately

v0 (x, δ)

c̃(δ) ≤

b1 −b2
ρ

Never exercise the option

v∞ (x)

Exercise the option immediately

v0 (x, δ)

0 ≤ x ≤ x∗2 (δ)
c̃(δ) >

v(x, δ)

b1 −b2
ρ

x∗2 (δ) < x

Continue in current mode until

τ2∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|x ≤ x∗2 (δ)}

vc,2 (x, δ)



ri (µ − ρ)
b1 − b2
− c̃(δ) e−µδ , for i = 1, 2
=
(a1 − a2 )(ri − 1)
ρ
p
(σ 2 − 2µ) + (2µ − σ 2 )2 + 8ρσ 2
r1 =
2σ 2
p
(σ 2 − 2µ) − (2µ − σ 2 )2 + 8ρσ 2
r2 =
2σ 2
{(a1 − a2 )e(µ−ρ)δ − a1 }x b1 − b2 −ρδ b1
v0 (x, δ) =
−
e
+ + e−ρδ c̃(δ)
µ−ρ
ρ
ρ
a1 x
b1
v∞ (x) =
+
ρ−µ
ρ


ri
−ρδ
a1 x
e
b 1 − b2
x
b1
vc,i (x, δ) =
− c̃(δ)
−
+
, for i = 1, 2
ri − 1
ρ
x∗i (δ)
µ−ρ
ρ
x∗i (δ)

(3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)
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equal to the threshold level, the system operator is indifferent between exercising and
continuing.

Effect of Delay on Optimal Control
In analyzing the effect of exercise delay on the optimal operational policy, the key
insight is that lengthening the exercise delay of the system increases the risk exposure
an operator faces when controlling the system flexibility. It turns out this increased
exposure has varying effects on the expected exercise time depending both on the
trend of the stochastic process and the effect of the option itself.
To concentrate on the effect of additional risk exposure, consider a constant exercise cost. If the exercise cost is a constant,

d ∗
x (δ)
dδ i

= −µx∗i (δ). When the stochastic

process has positive drift, µ > 0, the future state is likely to be favorable to an
upgraded system. This expectation hastens execution of a upgrade option given a
realization of underlying uncertainty, since

d ∗
x (δ)
dδ 1

< 0, and may eventually make

the option immediately desirable. On the other hand, the trend in the state variable means those longer delays make downgrade options increasingly dour. A longer
exercise delay lowers the threshold value for downgrading, because

d ∗
x (δ)
dδ 2

< 0, and

may eventually bring the option into the never desirable case. It implies that the
longer delay defers downgrading the system. In the case that µ < 0, the exercise
delay has opposite effects on the optimal operational policies, since
d ∗
x (δ)
dδ 2

d ∗
x (δ)
dδ 1

> 0 and

> 0.

In the interesting solution cases where the option is not currently desirable but
will be exercised if the state variable crosses some threshold this research provides
the following interpretation. If the trend of underlying uncertainty is favorable to the
alternative system, the system operator is essentially trading off the optimality of the
current system configuration in the current state against the future optimality of the
alternative system configuration in the uncertain future states. With highly flexible
systems (short exercising delays), the operator is able to delay execution when the
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trend of the stochastic process is favorable to the alternate system to squeeze ever
last drop out of the current system’s optimality. With less flexibility (longer exercise
delays) the system operator’s hand is forced to more quickly act upon the expected
optimality of the alternative system in future states.
Even when the trend of the underlying uncertainty is unfavorable to the alternative
system, flexibility may be exercised. It is the case that the realized uncertainty
is so favorable (to the alternative system) that the alternative system can harvest
enough benefits from the temporary advantageous status. In this case, a longer
delay requires more advantageous status to exercise the flexible option, and it results
postponements of execution time. In the view point of exposure delay, a longer delay
increases the risk that the realized advantageous status becomes unfavorable against
the alternative system. Therefore, the system operator exercises the flexible option
with more favorable realization of underlying uncertainty to compensate the increased
risk exposure due to the exercise delay.
The above analysis can be extended into the case that the exercise cost is a function
of exercise delay to consider both risk exposure effect and cost effect of exercise delay
upon optimal operational policy. Suppose that the exercise cost is once differentiable
with respect to exercise delay δ. The first derivative of the threshold value with
respect to exercise delay is expressed as



d ∗
b2 − b1
d
ri (µ − ρ)
x (δ) = −
µ
− µc̃(δ) + c̃(δ) e−µδ
dδ i
(a1 − a2 )(ri − 1)
ρ
dδ

(3.11)

As shown in (3.11), even strong assumptions such as convexity or monotonicity of
the exercise cost function do not guarantee straightforward relationships between exh
i
d
1
ercise delay and exercise time. If dδ
c̃(δ) > µ c̃(δ) − b2 −b
then x∗i (δ) is increasing,
h ρ
i
b2 −b1
d
∗
otherwise xi (δ) is decreasing. Given that dδ c̃(δ) > µ c̃(δ) − ρ , ∀δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ],
the optimal threshold value of upgrade is a monotone decreasing function and that of
downgrade is a monotone increasing function in exercise delay. Hence the expected
exercise time is monotone decreasing with respect to exercise delay in both of the
h
i
d
1
cases. On the other hand, if dδ
c̃(δ) < µ c̃(δ) − b2 −b
, ∀δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ], the relaρ
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tionships are reversed. The integrated effect of exercise delay is summarized in Table
3.2.
Table 3.2
The Effect of Exercise Delay upon Optimal Operational Policy
d
dδ c̃(δ)

3.3.3

h
> µ c̃(δ) −

b2 −b1
ρ

i

d
dδ c̃(δ)

h
< µ c̃(δ) −

b2 −b1
ρ

i

Upgrade

Longer delay postpones

Longer delay hastens

(a1 < a2 )

the expected exercise time.

the expected exercise time.

Downgrade

Longer delay hastens

Longer delay postpones

(a1 > a2 )

the expected exercise time.

the expected exercise time.

Optimal Design of Flexible System

This section investigates the problem faced by a system designer; how much exercise delay (flexibility) to build into a system. At the design stage, a system designer
chooses the optimal length of exercise delay assuming the system is operated optimally as summarized in Theorem 3.1. The first insight this dissertation discovers is
that the design problem is decomposed into two sub-problems based on the optimal
operation. Moreover, this research effort discovers that when the exercise cost and
system design cost are once differentiable with respect to the length of exercise delay, the design problem is well posed and solvable with usual non-linear optimization
method such as KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions.

Decomposition of Design Problem
To illustrate the structure of optimal design problem, consider an upgrade case.
Here, this research postulates that the exercise cost is a continuous function with respect to exercise delay to reflect more situations. Figure 3.1 demonstrates an example
of the structure of an operational value of a flexible system under optimal operation.
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Figure 3.1. Structure of Flexible System Design Problem with Delay

The horizontal and vertical axis stands for the length of exercise delay, δ, and
the current value of state variable, X(0), respectively. In the assumed case there
exists a threshold value x∗1 (δ) that determines the optimal operational policy. If the
current state variable X(t) is smaller than x∗1 (δ), staying current mode is optimal. In
opposition, if X(t) ≥ x∗1 (δ), exercising the flexible option is optimal. Therefore the
region above x∗1 (δ) is called exercising region and that below x∗1 (δ) is continuation
region. In the exercising region, the operational value of flexible system is v0 (X(0), δ)
and that in the continuation region is vc,1 (X(0), δ).
Let x∗min and x∗max be the minimum and maximum value of x∗1 (δ). If the current state is higher than x∗max or lower than x∗min , the the design problem is simple.
If X(0)x∗max , such as X(0) = x1 , the operational value function is v(X(0), δ) =
v0 (X(0), δ), ∀δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ], and v0 (X(0), δ) is given in Theorem 3.3.1 explicitly.
Therefore the design problem (3.3) becomes V (x) = supδ∈[δmin ,δmax ] [v0 (X(0), δ) −
C(δ)]. Similarly, when X(0)x∗min , for instance X(0) = x3 , the operational value
function is vc,1 (X(0), δ), for all δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]. Therefore the design problem is
V (x) = supδ∈[δmin ,δmax ] [vc,1 (X(0), δ) − C(δ)]. Given the once differentiability assump-
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tions of cost functions, it is a nice behave non-linear optimization problem that is
solvable with usual techniques.
When X(0) ∈ (x∗min , x∗max ), the design problem becomes complicated. Suppose
that the system designer sets δ ∈ [0, δ̄ 1 ) ∪ (δ̄2 , δmax ]. Then the operator waits until
the underlying uncertainty X(t) hits the threshold value x∗1 (δ) to exercise the flexible
option. Hence, the operational value function v(X(0), δ) = vc,1 (X(0), δ). Otherwise,
the operator exercise the option immediately and the operational value function is
v(X(0), δ) = v0 (X(0), δ). Notice that the objective function of design problem is the
sum of operational value function and the system design cost. Since the length of
delay changes the objective function of design problem, the system design problem is
decomposed into two sub problems. Following theorem provides the characteristics
of design level problem in complicated cases, which is helpful for computation.
Theorem 3.3.2 When the exercise cost and system design cost are continuous with
respect to δ, the design problem (3.3) is decomposable into two nonlinear optimization
problems. For upgrade cases, the optimal solution of design problem is obtained by
comparing the two solutions of sub-problems:






maxδ v0 (X(0), δ) − C(δ)
maxδ vc,1 (X(0), δ) − C(δ)




and P2 =
P1 =
s.t.
δmin ≥ δ ≤ δmax
s.t.
δmin ≤ δ ≤ δmax








X(0) ≥ x∗1 (δ)
X(0) ≤ x∗1 (δ)
(3.12)
For downgrade cases, the design level problem is solvable by decomposing the original
design problem into two sub-problems:



maxδ vc,2 (X(0), δ) − C(δ)


and
P1 =
s.t.
δmin ≤ δ ≤ δmax




X(0) ≥ x∗ (δ)
2




maxδ v0 (X(0), δ) − C(δ)


P2 =
s.t.
δmin ≥ δ ≤ δmax




X(0) ≤ x∗2 (δ)
(3.13)

Proof in Appendix A.2
The sub-problem P1 can be interpreted as finding the optimal configuration with
the constraints forcing the system operator to wait until the execution criterion is
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satisfied. On the other hand, P2 means that with constraints compelling the system
operator exercise the flexible option immediately. Since each sub-problem attains
its maximum in the feasible region, the objectives of decomposed problems are maximization instead of finding supremum in (3.4). Moreover, when the cost functions are
smooth, the objective functions are smooth as well. It implies that usual non-linear
optimization techniques (such as KKT conditions) are able to be employed to solve
the design problem.

Illustrative Examples
This subsection provides an illustrative example in the context of renewable energy source expansion flexibility [89, pp.164-165]. Suppose that an electric utility
considers investing in an expandable power plant. The power plant starts with a
limited number of turbines, and if the electricity price goes up the utility can double
up the capacity. The expansion takes time and the utility can expedite the expansion by paying additional amount of money. At the design phase, the utility system
designer decides how fast the power plant is expanded. The system operators task is
to increase the capacity at the right time observing the electricity price.
The electricity price follows a geometric Brownian motion described in (3.1) with
µ = 0.02 and σ = 0.1. It means that the price is expected to be increased with 2%
per year continuous compound growth rate, and the price process has 10% volatility.
Before the expansion, the power plant generates a unit of electricity with a unit cost,
i.e., a1 = 1 and b1 = −1. When the generation capacity is doubled up, the generating
cost increases proportionally (a2 = 2 and b2 = −2). The discount rate is assumed to
be 5%, i.e., ρ = 0.05. The system building cost and the exercise cost are assumed to
be
c̃(δ) = −e−δ ,

C(δ) =

1
δ

The system building cost is inversely proportional to the exercise delay and is motivated by [139, 140]. Both of the papers asserted that the value of a supply chain
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is inverse proportional to response time. The exponential decreasing exercise cost
is intuitively acceptable. Moreover, the exercise cost yields a monotone decreasing
x∗1 (δ), and it is helpful to clarify the structure of decomposition. This research sets
the range of exercise delay as δmin = 0.1 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = 10, where δ is the exercise
delay in years.
This section focuses on exemplifying the process of solving the design problem
using Theorem 3.3.2 rather than providing the specific results. For the readers who
are interested in replicating the results, the numerical solution is given in Appendix
B.3. Since this example is an upgrade case, x∗1 (δ) divides the design problem into two

x∗1 (δ)
X(0)

x∗max

X(0)

x∗min

δmin

δ̄

δmax

Exercise Delay δ

Figure 3.2. Exercising Threshold Value and Decomposition

sub-problems. With the postulated parameters and exercise cost, x∗1 (δ) decreases as
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the exercise delay increases. The maximum of x∗1 (δ) is attained when the exercised
delay is set to be δmin , and the maximum is attained at δmax . The horizontal axis
represents the length of delay (δ), and the vertical axis represents the price of electricity. The solid line of Figure 3.2 shows the threshold value x∗1 (δ), and the dotted
line represents the current electricity price X(0). Notice that the current price and
exercising threshold value are identical at δ = δ̄, and x∗1 (δ) is higher than X(0) for
δ < δ̄. This implies that if the system designer sets the length of delay less than δ̄,
the system operator waits until the price goes up x∗1 (δ) to expand the capacity. The
optimal configuration of the expandable power plant for δ < δ̄ is obtained by solving
P1 . On the other hand, the optimal operational decision is expanding the capacity as
soon as possible when the power plant is designed with exercise delay δ that is longer
than δ̄. By solving P2 , the system designer can find the optimal design.
Figure 3.3 represents the objective function value of design problem v(X(0), δ, θ)−
C(δ) with respect to exercise delay, given the current electricity price. The solid
line represents the objective function value of P1 and the dashed line stands for
that of P2 . The optimal solution of each sub-problems are denoted by δ1∗ and δ2∗ .
Since the optimal solution of P1 yields higher value V ∗ than that of P2 , the optimal
solution of design problem is δ1∗ . Therefore, the expandable power plant is designed
to increase its capacity in δ1∗ , and the system operator expand the capacity when the
electricity price goes up to x∗1 (δ1∗ ), given the current price X(0). In analyzing the
optimal flexibility design with respect to the current price, this research focuses on
the area, X(0) ∈ [x∗min , x∗max ] in which the design problem need to be decomposed
into two sub-problem.
Figure 3.4 shows the optimal objective function values of sub-problems with respect to current electricity price X(0). The solid line is the optimal value of P1 and
the dotted line is that of P2 . In Figure 3.5, the solid line (δ1∗ ) and the dotted line (δ2∗ )
represents the optimal solution of P1 and that of P2 , respectively. In Figure 3.4, the
optimal value of P1 is greater than that of P2 when the current price is lower than
x̄. Among the exercise delays those force the system operator stay in the current
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V∗

P1∗
P2∗
δmin

δ1∗

δ2∗

δmax

Exercise Delay δ

Figure 3.3. Design Problem Objective Function Value

capacity until the price goes up high enough, δ1∗ is the best choice. On the other
hand, δ2∗ yields the highest value among the exercise delays those compel the system
operator to expand the capacity immediately. Since P1∗ is higher than P2∗ when the
current price is lower than x̄, it is optimal for the system designer to set the exercise
delay as δ1∗ , and for the system operator to wait until the electricity price grows up
to x∗1 (δ1∗ ). On the other hand, when the current price is higher than x̄, the value of
expandable power plant is maximized by starting the expansion immediately within
δ2∗ . Therefore, the shaded δ ∗ in Figure 3.4 is the optimal solution of overall design
problem based on the current price of electricity.
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Figure 3.4. Optimal Objective Function Values of Sub-problems

With the given assumptions about the cost functions, an exercise delay that enforces the system operator to hold the expansion option is lower than that of immediate expansion. Therefore, δ1∗ is always lower than δ2∗ . Since a higher electricity price
is more desirable for expanding the capacity, higher price provides an incentive to
shorten the exercise delay at the expense of higher costs. The downward slopes of δ1∗
and δ2∗ reflect this incentive. When the current price is low, immediate upgrade of the
system is not attractive. Therefore to save on costs, the system designer chooses a
longer delay among the delays forcing an immediate upgrade. However, if the system
designer selects a relatively short delay among the delays which make the system
operator hold off on the expansion option until the electricity price becomes favor-
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Figure 3.5. Optimal Solutions of Sub-problems

able enough for the capacity expansion. Between the optimal choices, δ1∗ yields higher
value than δ2∗ when the current price is lower than x̄ as shown in Figure 3.4. Therefore
the optimal solution of overall design problem is δ1∗ where X(0) < x̄. Notice that the
slope of δ1∗ in this region is determined by the additional costs to shorten the exercise
delay and incremental value of v( c, 1) (operational value function given that holding
the option is optional). Once the price reaches x̄, immediate expansion becomes more
beneficial than holing the expansion option for better chances. Hence, the optimal
solution of the overall design problem is δ2∗ where X(0) < x̄. In this region the slope
changes because the additional costs and incremental value of v0 determine the slope.

49
3.4

Multiple Alternatives Model
This section extends the model of Section 3.3 including the level of capacity change

as a design variable. In Section 3.3, the flexible system has only one alternative,
and the assumption helps to elucidate how exercise delay affects optimal decisions.
However, the extent of capacity change has been the main focus of flexible system
design. By considering both exercise delay and level of capacity change, this research
contributes to the research area of flexibility. Similar to the previous section, the
problem is postulated as a two levels decision problem. The system designer decides
the length of exercise delay and the level of capacity change imposing that the system
operator behaves optimally. At the operational level, a system operator chooses the
time to execute the flexible option.

3.4.1

Model

At the operational level, system operator decides the time to exercise the flexible
option, given the exercise delay δ and the level of capacity change ζ those are determined in design level. The operational performance function j(X(0), τ |δ, ζ) and value
function v(X(0), δ, ζ) are defined as

 R
τ +δ −ρt
−ρ(τ +δ)
e
{aX(t)
+
b}dt
+
e
c̃(δ,
ζ)

j(X(0), τ |δ, ζ) = E  0
R ∞ −ρt
+ τ +δ e ζ{aX(t) + b}dt
v(X(0), δ, ζ) = sup j(X(0), τ |δ, ζ)

(3.14)
(3.15)

τ

Consider a flexible energy utility, whose initial configuration generates a units of electricity with the operating cost −b. By paying the exercise cost or harvesting the
salvage value c̃(δ, ζ), the capacity can be increased or decreased to ζ units. It takes
time δ to adjust the capacity of the flexible power plant. The generating cost is
changed proportionally to the capacity change. The unit price of electricity follows
the geometric Brownian motion defined in (3.1). The system designer’s task is determining the length of exercise delay and the extent of capacity change assuming
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that the system operator optimally exercises the designed flexible option. The design
problem is expressed with
V (X(0)) = sup E [v(x(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ)]

(3.16)

(δ,ζ)∈A

The system designer can choose one of the flexible system configuration, which belongs
to A = [δmin , δmax ] × [ζmin , ζmax ]. Since negative δ and ζ do not have practical
meanings, this research assumes that 0 ≤ δmin ≤ δmax and 0 ≤ ζmin ≤ ζmax . If ζ > 1,
the capacity is increased when the expansion is completed. On the other hand, ζ < 1
means decrease the capacity.
This research considers continuous and once differentiable cost functions on A and
imposes following additional assumptions on cost functions.
c̃(δ, 1) = 0,
C(δ, 1) = 0,

∀δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]
∀δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]

(3.17)
(3.18)

Suppose that ζ = 1. Then the exercising flexible option does not change the capacity
of the system. The cases of c̃(δ, 1) 6= 0 and C(δ, 1) 6= 0 yield obvious solutions of
operational and design problems. To avoid these obvious solutions, (3.17) and (3.18)
are imposed. For example, if c̃(δ, 1) > 0 and ζ = 1, the system operator exercise the
option as soon as possible to acquire the free cash inflow.

3.4.2

Optimal Operational Policy

Given the exercise delay δ and the extent of change ζ, the optimal operational
policy is derived using Theorem 3.3.1 by setting a1 = a, a2 = ζa, b1 = b and b2 = ζb.
Theorem 3.4.1 summarizes the optimal policy.
Theorem 3.4.1 The optimal operational policy, the solution of (3.15), is summarized in Table 3.3, where r1 and r2 are identical to those in Theorem 3.3.1.
Notice that the threshold value of changing the system feature is expressed with
x∗i (δ, ζ) to emphasize on the effect of design variables on the operational policy. Theorem 3.4.1 is a straight forward application of Theorem 3.3.1 except for the case that
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Table 3.3
Optimal Operational Policy Given the System Configuration
X(0), θ

Optimal Operational Decision

v(X(0), δ, θ)

Continue in the current mode until
ζ>1

0 ≤ X(0) < x∗1 (δ, ζ)
X(0) ≥ x∗1 (δ, ζ)
ζ=1

Exercise the option immediately
Indifferent

0 ≤ X(0) < x∗2 (δ, ζ)
ζ<1

τ1∗ {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗1 (δ, ζ)}

x∗2 (δ, ζ) < X(0)

Exercise the option immediately

vc,1 (X(0), δ, ζ)
v0 (X(0), δ, ζ)
aX(0)
ρ−µ

+

b
ρ

v0 (X(0), δ, ζ)

Continue in the current mode until
τ2∗ = {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≤ x∗2 (δ, ζ)}

vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ)

where for i = 1, 2
(3.19)



ri (µ − ρ)
b(1 − ζ)
− c̃(δ, ζ) e−µδ
(3.20)
x∗i (δ, ζ) =
a(1 − ζ)(ri − 1)
ρ


a(1 − ζ) (µ−ρ)δ
a
b(1 − ζ) −ρδ b
v0 (X(0), δ, ζ) =
e
−
e
+ + e−ρδ c̃(δ, ζ)
X(0) −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
ρ
ρ
(3.21)

r
e−ρδ b(1 − ζ)
X(0) i
a
b
vc,i (X(0), δ, ζ) =
−
− c̃(δ, ζ)
X(0) +
∗
ri − 1
ρ
xi (δ, ζ)
µ−ρ
ρ


(3.22)
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ζ = 1. The result for ζ = 1 is obtained by plugging ζ = 1 and c̃(δ, 1) = 0 into
(3.14) and (3.15). Notice that the system would not be changed by exercising the
flexible option when ζ = 1. Therefore, the system operator is indifferent to whether
to exercise the flexible option or not.

3.4.3

Optimal Design

The design problem is also decomposable with sub-problems, given the current
value of the underlying uncertainty X(0). If all the available alternatives are upgrade
options, 1 < ζmin , the decomposition is similar to (3.12). In the case that 1 > ζmax , all
the alternatives are downgrade options. Therefore, the the decomposition is similar
to (3.13). However, when the set of alternatives includes upgrade, downgrade and
staying with the current system mode, i.e., 1 ∈ [ζmin , ζmax ], the design problem is not
well-posed, since x∗i (δ, ζ) is not defined at ζ = 1. This research finds that the design
problem can be decomposed into well behaved sub-problems by imposing a fictional
threshold if it is necessary. For notational simplicity, define A = [δmin , δmax ] × [ζmin , 1]
and Ā = [δmin , δmax ] × [1, ζmax ] for the case that ζmin ≤ 1 ≤ ζmax .
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Theorem 3.4.2 Assume that c̃(δ, ζ) and C(δ, ζ) are once differentiable on A. The
design problem (3.15) is decomposed



maxδ,ζ


P1 =
s.t.







maxδ,ζ


P2 =
s.t.







maxδ,ζ


P3 =
s.t.







maxδ,ζ


P4 =
s.t.




If

b
ρ

+

∂c̃(δ,ζ)
∂ζ

into four sub-problems.
v0 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ)
(3.23)

(δ, ζ) ∈ A
X(0) ≤ x∗2 (δ, ζ)
vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ)

(3.24)

(δ, ζ) ∈ A
X(0) ≥ x∗2 (δ, ζ)
vc,1 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ)

(3.25)

(δ, ζ) ∈ Ā
X(0) ≤ x∗1 (δ, ζ)
v0 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ)

(3.26)

(δ, ζ) ∈ Ā
X(0) ≥ x∗1 (δ, ζ)

< 0, the threshold value is defined as
ζ=1

"

x∗i (δ, 1) =

ri (µ − ρ) b
∂c̃(δ, ζ)
+
a(ri − 1) ρ
∂ζ

#
e−µδ
ζ=1

.
Proof in Appendix A.3
It is worthwhile to review the economic meanings of decomposed problems. Postulate that the constraints of (3.23) are satisfied in the design phases. Then the
designed features of the flexible system is downgrading the capacity with a exercise
delay. Moreover the designed features force the system operator to start the reducing
capacity immediately. In the feasible region of (3.24), the system capacity is decreased by exercising the flexible option, and the capacity reduction starts when the
underlying uncertainty hits x∗2 (δ, ζ) that is lower than the current status. If the constraints of (3.25) are satisfied, the flexible system is designed to expand its capacity,
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and the expansion starts when the underlying uncertainty reaches the threshold value
x∗1 (δ, ζ) that is higher than current state. The region that the constraints of (3.26) are
satisfied, the flexible system has expansion option, and the expansion starts as soon
as possible, because the exercising threshold value is lower than the current state.

Illustrative Example
This subsection provides another illustrative example. An electric utility considers
investing in a flexible power plant whose capacity change takes time δ. The generation
capacity is changed from 1 to ζ by exercising the flexible option. The system operator’s task is finding the optimal time to start altering the capacity, and the system
designer’s is determining optimal δ and ζ considering the related costs and benefits.
The parameters representing the market conditions are the same to the previous example, i.e., µ = 0.02, σ = 0.1 and ρ = 0.05. The range of possible choices for system
designer is assumed to be δmin = 0.1 ≤ δ ≤ δmax = 10 and ζmin = 0 ≤ ζ ≤ ζmax = 3.
The economic implication of the range of possible capacity change is that the utility
can increase its capacity by three times of current capacity at most, and can reduce
the capacity as much as the company wants. The reduction of capacity even includes
exiting from the industry by choosing ζ = 0.
The the exercise cost c̃(δ, ζ) and system building cost C(δ, ζ) are assumed to be
c̃(δ, ζ) = (1 − ζ)e−δ ,

C(δ, ζ) =

(ζ − 1)2
δ

These assumptions concurs with the assumptions in (3.17) and (3.18). Moreover,
these costs represent that quick response system costs more in both exercise and design
phases, because

∂
c̃(δ, ζ)
∂δ

< 0 and

∂
C(δ, ζ)
∂δ

< 0. When the capacity is increased,

the system operator pays change cost, i.e., c̃(δ, ζ) < 0 for ζ > 1. On the other
hand, a capacity scale down causes a cash inflow from salvage values of existing
facilities, i.e., c̃(δ, ζ) > 0 for ζ < 1. However, the more the system can change its
capacity, the more flexible the system is no matter what the direction of the change
is. Therefore, the system designing cost is a convex function in the extend of capacity
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change and is minimized at ζ = 1. The system building cost reflects this aspect, since
∂
C(δ, ζ)
∂ζ

= 0 and
ζ=1

∂2
C(δ, ζ)
∂ζ 2

> 0.
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Figure 3.6. Value Functions of Sub-Problems
The lines P1∗ , P2∗ , P3∗ and P4∗ in Figure 3.6 represent the optimal objective function values of the sub-problems P1 , P2 , P3 and P4 , respectively. The shaded line V ∗
represents the optimal function value of overall design problem. Notice that the subproblems are not defined for the entire domain of [xmin , xmax ]. For example, P3 is not
defined for high X(0) close to xmax . It means that no configuration of the expandable
power plant satisfies the constraints of the sub-problem P3 for the high enough initial
electricity price.
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Figure 3.6 provides more information than the value of the optimally designed
power plant. In the region of [0, x̄1 ], P1 yields the highest value. Considering the
economic meaning of P1 , this result implies that the flexible option of the power
plant is designed to be reduction of the capacity, and the system operator exercise
the option immediately. If the current price is higher than x̄1 and lower than x̄2 , the
flexible power plant must be designed to expand its capacity by exercising the flexible
option, and the system operator waits until the price rises to x∗1 (δ ∗ , ζ ∗ ). When the
current price is higher than x̄2 ,
10
9

3
Optimal Design of Capacity Change ζ*

Optimal Design of Exercise Delay δ*
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3
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(a) Optimal Exercise Delay

xmax
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x̄1

x̄2

xmax

Current Electricity Price X(0)

(b) Optimal Capacity Change

Figure 3.7. Optimal Flexible Wind Farm Configurations

Figure 3.7 shows the optimal design of the flexible power plant. Figure 3.7(a) and
Figure 3.7(b) illustrate the optimal exercise delay and the optimal capacity change
with respect to the current electricity price, respectively. In the region of [xmin , x̄1 ],
the utility exits from the energy market in a relatively short time, and the exit starts
immediately. When the current price belongs to the intermediate region [x̄1 , x̄2 ], the
flexible power plant is designed with an expansion option that expands the capacity
of the power plant three times in a relatively long expansion period. The system
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operator wait until the electricity price reaches to a threshold value x∗1 (δ ∗ , ζ ∗ ) that is
higher than the current price. If the current price is higher than x̄2 , the utility starts
the capacity expansion immediately. The capacity is increased up to the maximum
capacity and it takes shorter time than the time of the intermediate region and longer
time than the exit case. For the readers who are interested in replicating this example,
the author provides the critical values, x̄1 ≈ 0.4349 and x̄2 ≈ 1.1154.

3.5

Delayed Flexible System Summary
Systems engineering and design are called on to develop increasingly complex and

costly systems. These systems must have appropriate levels of flexibility in order to
maintain relevance and capitalize on opportunities. Section 3.3 modeled the control
of a flexible system as a delayed optimal stopping problem assuming the available
capability change is fixed. Section 3.4 extended the model of Section 3.3 by including
the level of capability change into the design variables. The measure of flexibility
considered at the design phase was the delay between the decision to exercise flexible
alternatives and the implementation of such decisions. First solving for optimal control policies, the author constructed the parameter settings and thresholds to guide
the system operator to exercise the option, continue, or never exercise. This research
finds a non-trivial effect of exercise delay upon operational decision. Turning to the
system design problem, when the cost (or revenue) resulting from exercising flexibility is once differentiable, the author provides concrete optimization problems for the
optimal system design that is solvable with usual non-linear optimization methods.
Although this research employs a relatively simple model of flexible systems in
order to preserve tractability, the author believes that these results can aid system
designers in choosing how flexible to make systems. Highlighting the delay between
decision time and implementation time will be especially important for systems in
which there is considerable value of flexibility, where system effectiveness is fundamentally tied to uncertainties which can be capitalized on.
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4. DUOPOLY MARKET SHARE COMPETITION WITH
ASYMMETRIC EXERCISE DELAY
4.1

Introduction
The research of flexibility has expanded to option exercise games which consider

the other decision makers’ behaviors since the 1990s. As investigated in Chapter 3,
exercise delay has significant impacts on the optimal operational policy and the value
of flexible systems. What if the flexible system with delay is exposed to other decision
maker’s action? To answer this question, this chapter extends the model in Chapter
3 including the interactions between decision makers by assuming one decision maker
operates a flexible system without exercise delay and the other manages another
flexible system with exercise delay.
An option exercise game is an appropriate model to evaluate flexible options when
the options interact with each other, since it is an integrated approach of game and real
option theories. One of the applicable areas of this research is evaluating an exclusive
patent with potential entry of alternative technology. When a firm acquires a patent,
the firm may not implement the patent protected technology to produce a new product
right away. The firm can wait until the new product market becomes profitable
enough to compensate the implementation costs. However, if the firm confronts the
threat from the other firm’s R&D opportunity, the threat should be considered. When
the growth of the market is stochastic, the option exercise games approach provides
valuable insight to evaluate the patent [89]. This research interprets an exclusive
patent as flexibility without exercise delay, and R&D opportunity as that with exercise
delay. If a firm has an exclusive patent, the firm can introduce a new product in a
short amount of time, by paying a relatively small implementation fee. On the other
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hand, the firm without patent should do R&D to introduce a comparable product, and
it takes considerable time and resources. Each firm decides when it launches the new
product or it starts the R&D project, reacting to uncertain market profitability and
the other competitor’s action. Therefore, the implementation of patent protected
technology is execution of a flexible option without exercise delay and initiating a
R&D project is that with exercising delay. This dissertation studies a patent and
R&D competition game in the prospect of option exercise games.
This research postulates two players are competing market share in a duopoly
market where the total market volume is stochastic. Both of the players are riskneutral, i.e., they are only interested in the expected profit, rather than including the
accompanying risks in their decisions. The players have complete information about
the competition. It means every player knows the payoffs and possible actions of other
players. About the information structure, this research considers both the open loop
structure and the close loop structure. In the open loop model, players cannot observe
the actions of other players after the beginning of the game. In the context that this
chapter considers, the players cannot detect when the other player introduces the
new product into the market and when the R&D project is initiated. On the other
hand, the closed loop model assumes that players have perfect information about the
past. So, as soon as one player starts to produce a new product or initiates the R&D
project, the other player knows about it.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides brief literature review
about preemption game, option exercise games with exercise delay and asymmetric
option exercise games. Section 4.3 provides the model of patent and R&D competition
under deterministic R&D duration and cost assumption. This section contains the
open loop and closed loop equilibrium of the option exercise game. Section 4.4 extends
the deterministic period and cost assumption to stochastic situation. Conclusions are
in section 4.5.
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4.2

Literature Review
This research models the problem as a stochastic preemption game in continuous

time. The continuous time preemption game between two identical firms under a
deterministic environment studied in the early 1980s. Reinganum [141, 142] studied
the equilibrium of the game. She assumed that the roles of players, the first mover
and the second mover, is predetermined. Therefore, the resulting equilibrium is an
open loop equilibrium. Moreover, she assumed that the market profitability is not
matured so that no player invests at the outset of the game. Under the assumption,
she found that either of the player exercises the option when the market is matured,
but simultaneous investment is not a equilibrium. Extending Reinganum’s work, Fudenberg and Tirole [6] constructed a mixed strategy space and derived mixed strategy
perfect equilibria. Since the role of each player is not determined at the beginning of
the game, the equilibrium is a closed loop equilibrium.
Following [141, 142], Smets [102] extended the deterministic setting to stochastic
environment, and applied it to international investment context. He considered two
identical firms as well and investigated pure strategy equilibrium. Huisman and Kort
extended deterministic mixed strategy equilibrium framework to stochastic games
in their series of studies [87, 143]. Spencer and Brander [144] studied duopoly with
quantity competition and derived closed form solution considering a random demand
which is determined by both of the participant’s production. Demand function was
modeled as a linear function that follows a random distribution on a closed interval.
Williams [92] provided the rigorous derivation of a Nash equilibrium in a real options
framework. He found the equilibrium in a strategic setting without delay, and the
fact that increasing competition leads to earlier exercise of options. Baldursson [145]
found Nash equilibrium and derived stochastic processes adapted optimal strategies
considering the exogenous process influencing demand. This is an open-loop strategy,
in the sense that there is no feedback from the investment of any firm to the investment
of any other firm.
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Grenadier [86] asserted that he derived the closed-loop solution of stochastic differential Cournot games. Based on dynamic programming approach, he derived a
differential equation which solves the differential game with boundary conditions;
continuity, smooth-pasting and super-contact conditions. He provided a closed-loop
strategy with the assumption of symmetric structure. Novy-Marx [146] extended
Grenadier’s work. He considered the case that firms are heterogeneous and found
the optimal investment decision under the assumptions of geometric Brownian motion and a constant elasticity demand function. Back and Paulsen [147] contradicted
Grenadier’s results. They proved the trigger strategies of [86] are not the best responses and derived the best response function under the assumption of geometric
Brownian motion and linear inverse demand curve. Back and Paulsen pointed out
the preemption opportunity is the incentive to deviate from the symmetric closedloop strategy provided in Grenadier [86]. Thijssen et al. [148] focused on the value
of preemption. When a player acquires the advantage of first mover, the player need
to take additional risk. Comparing the benefit of preemption and additional risk,
they provided the insight of optimal decision under a discontinuous stochastic environment. Thijssen et al. [149] studied an extended definition of strategy spaces
under jump diffusion stochastic environments. Steg [150] derived explicit solutions
under the assumptions that the exogenous uncertainty follows a Lévy process and
the inverse demand curve has a positive constant elasticity. Chevalier-Roignant et
al. [151] delivered a well-organized overview research about competitive investment
including quantity competition in oligopoly market and provided the mixed strategy
equilibrium framework that this research employs.
Asymmetric option exercising games, in which players have uneven profit structures or information, are an intensive research area. Pawlina and Kort [152] investigated an asymmetric investment costs case. They found that small cost differences
cause coordination problem which makes open loop equilibrium and close loop equilibrium different. However when the cost difference is significant, the two equilibria
are identical. Miltersen and Schwartz [153] considered asymmetry in the develop-
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ment and commercialization of a new product, in the context of patent protected
R&D investments. Murto [154] studied the production scale difference.
Several studies devoted themselves to the effect of exercising delay on option exercise games. Grenadier [93] and Weeds [98] considered exercising delay as a component
of duopoly option exercise games. Grenadier [93] studied deterministic exercising delay and Weeds [98] included stochastic exercising delay, which follows an exponential
distribution. However, to the best of author’s knowledge, asymmetric exercise delay
has not been studied in the context of option exercise games.

4.3

Fixed R&D Duration and Cost

4.3.1

Model

Two risk neutral players compete in a duopoly market. Firm P procured an
exclusive patent, and is waiting for the optimal time to implement the technology
into the market. As soon as firm P decides to implement the the technology, it can
increase its market share by paying an implementation fee IP . On the other hand,
firm D, the competitor of firm P , does not have the patent. So it takes time, δ ,
for firm D to invent a new technology that enables firm D to produce a comparable
product and does not infringe on the patent. The cost of R&D project is denoted by
ID and assumed to be paid at the beginning of the project. The initial market share
of firm D is π0 and the incremental market share is KD . Those of firm P are denoted
by 1 − π0 and KP , respectively. Since the negative market share does not make sense,
the market shares satisfy 0 ≤ π0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ KD ≤ 1 − π0 and 0 ≤ KP ≤ π0 .
A geometric Brownian motion with constant coefficients describes the total market
profit.
dX(t) = µX(t)dt + σX(t)dB(t),

X(0) = x0

(4.1)

where B(t) is the standard Brownian motion defined on a complete probability space
(Ω, F, P).
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Firm P launches the new product using patent protected technology at time τP ,
and firm D starts its R&D project at τD . The R&D project will be completed at
τD +δ and from this time firm D will earn higher profit. Each firm decides the optimal
τP and τD . The performance functions are described as the followings

Rτ
Rτ
J˜P (τP |τD , x0 ) = 0 m e−ρt (1 − π0 )X(t)dt + τmP e−ρt (1 − π0 − KD )X(t)dt − e−ρτP IP
Rτ
R∞
+ τPM e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP )X(t)dt + τM e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP − KD )X(t)dt
R τ +δ
Rτ
J˜D (τD |τP , x0 ) = 0 m e−ρt π0 X(t)dt + τmD e−ρt (π0 − KP )X(t)dt − e−ρτD ID
Rτ
R∞
+ τDM+δ e−ρt (π0 + KD )X(t)dt + τM e−ρt (π0 + KD − KP )X(t)dt
(4.2)
where τm = min(τP , τD + δ) and τM = max(τP , τD + δ). The discount factor ρ > 0
satisfies µ − ρ < 0 to ensure the existence of expected value.

4.3.2

Open Loop Equilibrium

In an open loop game, players decide their strategies at the beginning of the
game and would not change them, because the players do not acquire any further
information about other player’s action after the beginning of the game. Because the
firms are risk neutral, each player decides the optimal time to invest to maximize the
expected value of performance function. The relatively simple structure of this game
yields dominant strategy equilibrium. Each player has the dominant strategy which
is not affected by the other player’s strategy, and the equilibrium is unique. Theorem
4.3.1 summarizes the open loop equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3.1 In the open loop game, it is optimal for firm D to start it’s R&D
−(µ−ρ)δ

De
project at τD∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗D }, where x∗D = − r1 (µ−ρ)I
(r1 −1)KD

. For firm P the

P
optimal policy is τP∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗P }, where x∗P = − r(r1 (µ−ρ)I
. The expected
1 −1)KP

values of the systems are summarized in Table 4.1 for each case.
Proof See Appendix A.4.
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Table 4.1
The Value of Flexible Systems in the Open Loop Equilibrium
Optimal Trigger Points

x∗P < x∗D

x∗P

=

x∗D

x∗P > x∗D

Initial Market Profit

Player P

Player D

x0 ≥ x∗D

V1P (x0 , x0 )

V1D (x0 , x0 )

x∗P ≤ x0 < x∗D

V1P (x∗D , x0 )

V2D (x∗D , x0 , x0 )

x < x∗P

V2P (x∗P , x∗D , x)

V2D (x∗D , x∗P , x0 )

x0 ≥ x∗D = x∗P

V1P (x0 , x0 )

V1D (x0 , x0 )

x0 < x∗D = x∗P

V2P (x∗D , x∗P , x0 ) V2D (x∗P , x∗D , x0 )

x0 ≥ x∗P

V1P (x0 , x0 )

V2D (x0 , x0 )

x∗D ≤ x0 < x∗P

V2P (x∗P , x∗D , x0 )

V1D (x∗P , x0 )

x0 < x∗D

V2P (x∗P , x∗D , x0 ) V2D (x∗D , x∗P , x0 )

where
KD e(µ−ρ)δ (x∗D )1−r1 r1
KP
0
x0 − µ−ρ
x0 − IP − 1−π
x
µ−ρ 0
h µ−ρ∗ −r1
i
(µ−ρ)δ
∗
1−r
1
I (x )
K e
(x )
0
V2P (x∗P , x∗D , x0 ) = P r1P−1 + D µ−ρ D
x
xr01 − 1−π
µ−ρ 0

V1P (x∗D , x0 ) =

KP (x∗P )1−r1 r1
e(µ−ρ)δ
π0
x0 − KDµ−ρ
x0 − ID − µ−ρ
x0
µ−ρ
h
i
∗
−r
∗
1−r
1
I (x ) 1
K (xP )
π0
xr01 − µ−ρ
V2D (x∗D , x∗P , x0 ) = D r1D−1 + P µ−ρ
x0

V1D (x∗P , x0 ) =
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In the open loop equilibrium, the role of each player is determined by the profitability of technologies. When x∗P < x∗D , τP∗ < τD∗ . Therefore, Player P will be the
first mover in this case. On the other hand, if x∗D < x∗P , the role of each player is reversed. The case that x∗P < x∗D is equivalent to
KD e(µ−ρ)δ
ID

>

KP
IP

KD e(µ−ρ)δ
ID

<

KP
IP

, and x∗P > x∗D implies

. Notice that KP and KD represent the benefit from implementing

or developing new technologies, and ID and IP denote the costs. Therefore
and

KP
IP

KD e(µ−ρ)δ
ID

stand for the profitability of each technology. The open loop equilibrium

suggests that the player who has more profitable technology moves first. Since Player
P already procured the patent, the implementation fee IP of the patent protected
technology is probably lower than the R&D cost of Player D. When the patent protected technology and the researched and developed technology are comparable, KP
and KD tend to be close. In this case, Player P is inclined to be the first mover.
Notice that the dominant strategy holds for the oligopoly model as well. Suppose that there are N players in the oligopoly market.

Let In , δn and Kn de-

note player n’s exercise cost, exercise delay and incremental market share, respectively for n = 1, 2, · · · , N . Then each player’s dominant strategy is expressed with
−(µ−ρ)δn

ne
τn∗ = inf {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗n } where x∗n = − r1 (µ−ρ)I
(r1 −1)Kn

4.3.3

.

Closed Loop Equilibrium

In a closed loop game, every player observes the realized value of the stochastic
factor and competitors’ behavior as time goes by. Based on the observed information,
each player updates his or her strategy. This section investigates the mixed strategy
closed loop equilibria of the patent and R&D competition.
As soon as one player exercises the flexible option, the remainder faces a one
decision maker’s decision problem. Because there is only one chance of investment
and the investment is irreversible, the first mover cannot react to the second mover’s
action. Therefore, there is no reason the follower deviates from the optimal decision
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as a follower. It implies that the game ends when at least one player exercises his or
her option.
Henceforth, this research assumes x∗D > x∗P by considering the usual real world
situation that is stated in the open loop equilibrium. Since the analysis structure
for the case of x∗D < x∗P is similar to the assumed case, this assumption does not
deteriorate the value of this research. This research investigated the closed loop
equilibrium where the initial state of the sub-game is lower than any player’s open
loop exercising trigger point, i.e., x0 < x∗P where x0 is the initial market volume of
the sub-game starting at t0 . Moreover, the author does not include collaboration of
the players in the analysis.

Strategy and Equilibrium
It is worthwhile to review the development of strategy space in a preemption game.
Consider a duopoly market share competition game starting at time t0 with initial
total market volume X( t0 ). Suppose that no player exercises its flexible option until
time t which is later than t0 , i.e., t ≥ t0 , and the total market volume at that time
is Xt . Then the decision making structure from time t is exactly same to that from
the time t0 . Therefore the decision from time t ≥ t0 can be considered as another
game with initial state Xt . This game is called as a sub-game. A sub-game of an
original game should satisfy independence conditions [155, pp. 274]. The imposed
assumptions of this research guarantee to satisfy the assumptions.
In the deterministic continuous preemption game Fudenberg and Tirole [6] defined
strategy space with two real value function Gti (s) and qi (s), for s ≥ t, where t is the
starting time of a sub-game. The payoffs of players are deterministic and expressed
explicitly with respect to time. The first element of the strategy, Gti (s), stands for
the cumulative distribution function of the probability that Player i has exercised the
player’s option before or at time s ≥ t, given that the other player has not invested yet.
On the other hand, qi (s) represents Player i’s intensity of exercising option at time s.
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The intensity function qi (s) is employed to compensate the loss of information from
the naı̈ve extension of a discrete-time mixed strategy into a continuous-time game.
When both players have incentives to exercise option, at least one player will invest.
In this case the coordination problem occurs. The coordination means that which
player moves first or simultaneous move, when both players have incentive to be the
leader. The coordination of the players becomes a measure zero event if the strategy is
defined only with the cumulative distribution function. To address this coordination
problem, an atoms function in the sense of optimal control theory is needed. An
intuitive interpretation of the intensity function is a tie breaker. When both of the
players have incentive to invest, at least one of the players exercises the option. In this
case, the coordination is determined by the intensity function. In sum when Gti (s) > 0
for all i, who moves first or simultaneous investment is decided by the intensity of the
players. This strategy space is expended to stochastic contexts [149, 151, 152], and
this research follows Chevalier-Roignant and Trigeorgis’s framework [151, chapter 12].
A simple strategy consists of the two real value functions, Gti (s) and qi (s). A
pair of simple strategies (GtP (s), qP (s)) and (GtD (s), qD (s)) is a Nash equilibrium of
the sub-game starting at time t with neither player having exercised, if each player’s
strategy maximizes his payoff given the other player’s strategy fixed. Moreover, a
t
(s))}t≥t0 is a perfect
pair of closed-loop strategies {(GtP (s), qPt (s))}t≥t0 and {(GtD (s), qD

equilibrium of a game beginning at time t0 , if the simple strategies are Nash equilibria
∀t ≥ t0 .
For stochastic option exercise games, the simple strategies are Ft adapted rather
than explicit functions of time. Thijssen et al. [149] focused on this characteristics, but
they did not clarified the arguments of simple strategy. This research elucidates the
arguments of the simple strategies at the equilibrium relying on the Markov property
and existence of threshold types exercise trigger. Let M t (s) and mt (s) be the running
maximum and minimum of a stochastic process X(s) of a sub-game starting at t, i.e.,
M t (s) = maxt≤u≤s X(u) and mt (s) = mint≤u≤s X(u). The cumulative distribution
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function Gti (s) is explicitly expressed with the arguments as Gti (M t (s), mt (s)). The
intensity function is defined as qi (s) = qi (X(s)).

Terminal Payoff
There are three possible scenarios terminating the patent and R&D competition.
The first case is that both of the players exercise options, i.e., Player P starts to produce a new product and Player D launches the R&D project at the same time. When
the total market volume at the time of exercising the option is given as X(t) = x,
PM (x) and DM (x) represent the payoff of Player P and that of Player D, respectively.
Suppose that Player P preempts Player D by exercising his option when X(t) = x.
Then Player D optimally chooses the time to start R&D project as a follower. In this
case PL (x) and DF (x) denote the payoff of Player P as a leader and that of Player D
as a follower, respectively. On the other hand, when Player D starts the R&D project
first when X(t) = x, the payoff of Player P as a follower is denoted by PF (x) and
DL (x) represents that of Player D as a leader. The terminal payoffs are calculated
as followings and the detail calculation procedure is in Appendix B.1.
Player P ’s terminal payoffs


KD e(µ−ρ)δ − KP
1 − π0
PM (x) =
x
x − IP −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ

 PM (x)
 r
PL (x) =
 − ID r1 x∗ 1 − KP x − IP − 1−π0 x
r1 −1 xD
µ−ρ
µ−ρ

 PM (x)
 r1
PF (x) =
(µ−ρ)δ
x
 IP
+ KD e
x − 1−π0 x
∗
r1 −1

xP

µ−ρ

µ−ρ

(4.3)
x ≥ x∗D
x < x∗D
x ≥ x∗P
x < x∗P

(4.4)

(4.5)
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Player D’s terminal payoffs are


−KD e(µ−ρ)δ + KP
π0
DM (x) =
x − ID −
x
µ−ρ
µ−ρ

 DM (x)
 r
DL (x) =
 − IP r1 x∗ 1 − KD e(µ−ρ)δ x − ID − π0 x
r1 −1 xP
µ−ρ
µ−ρ

 DM (x)
 r1
DF (x) =
x
 ID
+ K P x − π0 x
∗
r1 −1

xD

µ−ρ

µ−ρ

(4.6)
x ≥ x∗P
x < x∗P
x ≥ x∗D
x < x∗D

(4.7)

(4.8)

where
ID e−(µ−ρ)δ (µ − ρ)r1
−KD (r1 − 1)
IP (µ − ρ)r1
x∗P =
−KP (r1 − 1)

x∗D =

(4.9)
(4.10)

Notice that PM (x) and DM (x) are straight lines with positive slope. Moreover,
PF (x) and DF (x) are positive, increasing and convex ∀x > 0, and PL (x), x ∈ (0, x∗D ),
and DL (x), x ∈ (0, x∗P ) are concave. With the assumption x∗P < x∗D , firm P ’s payoff
structure is unique, but there are two possible structures of firm D’s payoff according
to the parameter values. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of Player P ’s payoffs. The
blue solid, the red dash-dot and the black dash lines represent PM (x), PL (x) and
PF (x), respectively. The terminal payoffs inform fundamental incentive of Player P ’s
behavior. The intersection of PL (x) and PF (x) in (0, x∗P ) is unique and denoted by
xP . In the region of [0, xP ), Player P does not have incentive to be a leader, since
being follower provides higher payoff than being leader. When the current market
volume belongs to (xP , x∗P ), Player P wants to be a leader, but there is a risk having
undesirable payoff PM (x) if Player D starts R&D project at the same time. Figures
4.3.3 and 4.3.3 illustrate two cases of Player D’s payoff. When Player D’s payoff as
a leader, DL (x), never exceeds that as a follower, DF (x), Figure 4.3.3 illustrates the
payoffs. In this case, being a follower is preferable to moving first when x ∈ [0, x∗D ) and
indifferent when x = [x∗D , ∞) for Player D. It implies that Player D has no incentive
to start an R&D project earlier than Player P ’s introduction of new product because
of the assumption x∗P < x∗D . Because the quick response of Player P enables Player
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Figure 4.1. Player P ’s Payoff Structure

P not to be afraid of being preempted, this case is referred to a ‘Large Asymmetry’
case.
The other case, which is represented in Figure 4.3.3, is that DL (x) is higher than
DF (x) for x ∈ (xD , x̄D ). Notice that x̄D , the bigger intersection of DL (x) and DF (x),
is smaller than x∗P . This means when the total market volume belongs to an open
interval (xD , x̄D ), Player D has incentive to preempt Player P , even though there is
a risk of simultaneous movement. This case is referred to ‘Small Asymmetry’ case
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Figure 4.2. Player D’s Payoff with Large Asymmetry

Closed Loop Equilibrium with Large Asymmetry
When the patent provides large advantage to Player P , Player D does not have an
incentive to be the leader. With a large advantage of procuring a patent, the closed
loop equilibrium has a relatively simple strategy profile.
Theorem 4.3.2 If the set of parameters satisfies (4.11), DL (x) ≤ DF (x) for all
x ≥ 0.


 1
 r1
ID
r1 − 1 KP + KD e(µ−ρ)δ r1 −1
IP r1 r1 −1
ID
>
·
(4.11)
+
(x∗D )r1 (x∗P )r1
r1
ρ−µ
In this case, the following strategies are a perfect equilibrium for a game starting at


t0 with X(t0 ) < x∗p , where t0 ≤ t ≤ s.


 0 M t (s) < x∗

P
GtP (s) =
, qP (s) =
 1 M t (s) ≥ x∗

P


 0 M t (s) < x∗

D
GtD (s) =
qD (s) =
 1 M t (s) ≥ x∗

D

0 X(s) < x∗P
1 X(s) ≥ x∗P
0 X(s) < x∗D
1 X(s) ≥ x∗D

(4.12)

(4.13)
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Figure 4.3. Player D’s Payoff with Small Asymmetry

Proof See Appendix A.5
All games starting with X(t0 ) = x0 < x∗P end when Player P moves first at
the time τP∗ = inf {s ≥ t0 |X(s) ≥ x∗P }. Player D exercises its option when τD∗ =
inf {s ≥ t0 |X(s) ≥ x∗D }. The author remarks that this equilibrium is identical to the
open loop equilibrium in Theorem 4.3.1. This result implies that the coordination
problem does not occur with large asymmetry, and coincides with the previous research [151, pp. 393-394] [152].

Closed Loop Equilibrium with Small Advantage
If the set of parameters does not satisfy the inequality (4.11), Player D has incentive to preempt Player P in the region (xD , x̄D ). Given x0 < x∗P , Player P cannot
wait until the market volume grows up to x∗P due to the preemption threat from firm
D. This research seeks epsilon-equilibrium as the closed loop equilibrium. Intuitively
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speaking, in the context of a preemption game, a player can exercise his or her option
right before the time that the other player intends to. For more formal discussion,
refer to [156]. Here, this research assumes that xP < xD , and Section 4.4.3 discuss
the case that xP > xD
Theorem 4.3.3 Suppose that Player P has small advantage by procuring the patent,
i.e., the inequality (4.11) does not hold, and xP < xD . Then, the following simple
strategies consist of perfect equilibrium for a game starting at t0 with X(t0 ) = x0 < x∗P
and arbitrary small ε > 0, where t0 ≤ t ≤ s.



0
M t (s) < xD − ε


GtP (s) =
0
x̄D < mt (s) + ε and M t (s) < x∗P



 1
Otherwise



0
X(s) < xD




 DL (X(s))−DF (X(s))
xD ≤ X(s) ≤ x̄D
DL (X(s))−DM (X(s))
qP (s) =


0
x̄D < X(s) < x∗P





1
x∗P ≤ X(s)



0
M t (s) < xD


GtD (s) =
0
x̄D < mt (s) and M t (s) < x∗D



 1
Otherwise



0
X(s) < xD




 PL (X(s))−PF (X(s))
xD ≤ X(s) ≤ x̄D
PL (X(s))−PM (X(s))
qD (s) =


0
x̄D < X(s) < x∗D





1
x∗ ≤ X(s)

(4.14)

(4.15)

(4.16)

(4.17)

D

Proof See Appendix A.6
The profile of perfect equilibrium strategies implies the players’ behaviors according to the initial state of the game x0 as follows.
1. x0 < xD
Player P preempts Player D by implementing the patent protecting technology
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at the moment right before X(s) hits xD . In other words, Player P moves first
when τP∗ = inf{s ≥ t0 |X(s) ≥ xD − ε}. Therefore, the simultaneous investment,
which is called ‘coordination failure,’ would not happen.
2. xD ≤ x0 ≤ x̄D
In this case, both players have incentive to exercise their option at the beginning
of the game. Therefore, the game ends immediately, since at least one player
exercises his or her option. The coordination is determined by the intensity of
the players, qP (x0 ) and qD (x0 ). Let P(Leader=P ) (x0 ) = P(Follower=D) (x0 ) denote
the probability of Player P is the leader and Player D is the follower. Similarly, P(Leader=D) = P(Follower=P ) (x0 ) represents the probability that the roles of
players are reversed. The probability of simultaneous execution is connoted by
P(Simultaneous Investment) (x0 ). At the equilibrium, the probabilities are calculated
as
qP (x0 )(1 − qD (x0 ))
qP (x0 ) + qD (x0 ) − qP (x0 )qD (x0 )
qD (x0 )(1 − qP (x0 ))
P(Leader=D) (x0 ) =
qP (x0 ) + qD (x0 ) − qP (x0 )qD (x0 )
qD (x0 )qP (x0 )
P(Simultaneous Investment) (x0 ) =
qP (x0 ) + qD (x0 ) − qP (x0 )qD (x0 )

P(Leader=P ) (x0 ) =

(4.18)
(4.19)
(4.20)

3. x̄D < x0 < x∗P
Player P moves first at the time either the market volume grows up to x∗P or
shrinks to x̄D −ε. Therefore Player P is the leader, and simultaneous investment
does not happen.
Comparing to the open loop equilibrium stated in Theorem 4.3.1, the closed loop
information structure hastens the players’ investment time when the asymmetry of
exercise delay is small. Moreover, the expected payoff of the player who retains a
competitive advantage from a short exercise delay with closed loop information is less
than or equal to that with open loop information.
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4.4

Stochastic R&D Duration and Cost
In this section, the assumptions about fixed R&D project period and cost in

Section 4.3 are relaxed to stochastic variables. In the real world, required time and
cost of a R&D project is not known in advance. To consider this aspect, the delay
of implementing decision is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with mean
1/γ, i.e. δ(γ) ∼ exp(γ) and γ > 0. This assumption is accepted by previous research
such as [98]. Since the structure of this game is almost identical to the structure
of the game in Section 4.3, this section focuses on the difference from the previous
section.

4.4.1

Model

The unit cost per time of the R&D project is fixed as c > 0. Although the
cost per unit time is fixed, the total cost of the R&D project is random due to
the random duration of the project. The other settings are identical to section 4.3.
Player P is endowed with the initial market share (1 − π0 ), and possesses the patent
protected technology that enables introducing a new product without exercise delay.
By investing IP at the time τP , Player P increases his or her market share by 0 ≤
KP ≤ π0 . Player D starts the R&D project at time τD and the project is completed
at τD + δ(γ). Initially, Player D’s market share is π0 , and it can be increased by KD
from τD + δ(γ). The increase of a player’s market share causes the other player’s loss
of market share. The other conditions for parameter values hold as well. Reflecting
the stochastic duration of R&D project, the performance functions for players are
expressed as the following.
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Rτ
e−ρt (1 − π0 )X(t)dt + τmP e−ρt (1 − π0 − KD )X(t)dt − e−ρτP IP
0
Rτ
R∞
+ τPM e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP )X(t)dt + τM e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP − KD )X(t)dt
R τ +δ(γ) −ρt
Rτ
= 0 m e−ρt π0 X(t)dt + τmD
e (π0 − KP )X(t)dt
R τM
R τ +γ
+ τD +δ(γ) e−ρt (π0 + KD )X(t)dt − τDD e−ρt cdt
R∞
+ τM e−ρt (π0 + KD − KP )X(t)dt

JP (τP |τD , x0 ) =

JD (τD |τP , x0 )

R τm

(4.21)

4.4.2

Open Loop Equilibrium

This game also yields the following dominant strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.1 In the open loop setting, it is optimal for Player D to start its R&D
project at τD∗ = inf {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗D }. For Player P , it is optimal to implement the
new technology at τP∗ = inf {t ≥ 0|X(t) ≥ x∗P }. The optimal trigger points are
r1 IP (µ − ρ)
KP (r1 − 1)
cr1 (µ − ρ)(µ − ρ − γ)
x∗D =
γKD (r1 − 1)(ρ + γ)
x∗P = −

(4.22)
(4.23)

Proof See Appendix A.7.
Similar to the fixed R&D duration and cost case, the open loop equilibrium implies
that the profit-abilities of patent and R&D determine the coordination of players. If
IP
KP

c(µ−ρ−γ)
< − γK
, Player P moves first, because x∗P < x∗D . On the other hand, if
D (ρ+γ)

IP
KP

c(µ−ρ−γ)
> − γK
, Player D becomes the leader.
D (ρ+γ)

4.4.3

Closed Loop Equilibrium

To investigate the closed loop equilibrium, this research assumes x∗P < x∗D same
as the previous section.
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Terminal Payoff
As shown in Section 4.3.3, the terminal payoffs are the cornerstones of deriving
the closed loop equilibrium. The author summarizes the terminal payoffs in (4.24)
- (4.29) and provides the detail procedure of calculation in Appendix B.2. If both
players exercise the options at the same time when X(t) = x, Player P ’s payoff
is PM (x), and that of Player D is DM (x). When Player P preempts Player D by
implementing its patented technology at X(t) = x, Player P earns PL (x), and Player
D receives DF (x). Suppose that Player D starts the R&D project when X(t) = x
before Player P introduces a new product using the patent. Then Player D and
Player P gross DL (x) and PF (x), respectively.




KP
γKD
1 − π0
PM (x) = −
+
x
x − IP −
(µ − ρ − γ)(µ − ρ) µ − ρ
µ−ρ


PM (x)
x ≥ x∗D
 r1
PL (x) =
γKD
cr1
x
 −
0
− (µ−ρ)(µ−ρ−γ)
x − 1−π
x x < x∗D
(r1 −1)(ρ+γ) x∗D
µ−ρ


PM (x)
x ≥ x∗P
 r1
PF (x) =
γKD
x
 IP
0
x − 1−π
x x < x∗P
− (µ−ρ)(µ−ρ−γ)
r1 −1 x∗P
µ−ρ


γKD
KP
π0
c
DM (x) =
+
−
x
x−
(µ − ρ − γ)(µ − ρ) µ − ρ
ρ+γ µ−ρ


DM (x)
x ≥ x∗P
 r1
DL (x) =
γKD
π0
x
c
 − IP r 1
+ (µ−ρ)(µ−ρ−γ)
x − ρ+γ
− µ−ρ
x x < x∗P
(r1 −1) x∗P


DM (x)
x ≥ x∗D


DF (x) =
r1
c
x

+ KP x − π0 x x < x∗
∗
(r1 −1)(ρ+γ)

xD

µ−ρ

µ−ρ

(4.24)

(4.25)

(4.26)

(4.27)

(4.28)

(4.29)

D

Notice that the terminal payoffs have the identical structures to the deterministic
R&D duration and cost case. The payoffs, PM (x) and DM (x), are straight lines with
positive slopes, and PF (x) and DF (x) are increasing convex. Moreover, PL (x) for
x ∈ [0, x∗D ] and DL (x) for x ∈ [0, x∗P ] are concave.
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Closed Loop Equilibrium
Since the terminal payoff structures are identical to those with fixed R&D duration
and costs, the equilibrium is the same to the case of fixed R&D duration and costs
except for the value of focal points such as xP , xD and x̄D . When the patent provides a
small advantage, i.e., DL (x) ≤ DF (x), ∀x ≥ 0, the closed loop equilibrium is identical
to the equilibrium stated in (4.12) and (4.13) with the threshold values in (4.22) and
(4.23). If the patent provides a large advantage, i.e., DL (x) ≥ DF (x) for xD ≤ x ≤
x̄D , the equilibrium is derived with the same procedure in section 4.3.3. Since the
equilibrium stated in Theorem 4.3.3 assumed xP < xD , the author states the closed
equilibrium when xP > xD . The proof in Appendix A.6 covers this theorem as well.
Theorem 4.4.2 Suppose that Player P has small advantage by procuring the patent,
i.e., DL (x) ≥ DF (x) for xD ≤ x ≤ x̄D , and xP > xD . Then, the following simple
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strategies consist of perfect equilibrium for a game starting at t0 with X(t0 ) = x0 < x∗P
and arbitrary small ε > 0, where t0 ≤ t ≤ s.



0
M t (s) < xP


GtP (s) =
0
x̄D < mt (s) + ε and M t (s) < x∗P



 1
Otherwise



0
X(s) < xP




 DL (X(s))−DF (X(s))
xP ≤ X(s) ≤ x̄D
DL (X(s))−DM (X(s))
qP (s) =


0
x̄D < X(s) < x∗P





1
x∗P ≤ X(s)



0
M t (s) < xP − ε


GtD (s) =
0
x̄P < mt (s) and M t (s) < x∗D



 1
Otherwise



0
X(s) < xP




 PL (X(s))−PF (X(s))
xP ≤ X(s) ≤ x̄D
PL (X(s))−PM (X(s))
qD (s) =


0
x̄D < X(s) < x∗D





1
x∗ ≤ X(s)

(4.30)

(4.31)

(4.32)

(4.33)

D

Proof See Appendix A.6
The players’ behaviors on the perfect equilibrium are summarized as the following.
1. x0 < xP : Player D starts R&D project before Player P introduce a new product
when the market volume grows to X(s) ≥ xP .
2. xD ≤ x0 ≤ x̄D : At least one player exercises the flexible option, and the game
ends at the outset of the game. The probability of the coordination is the same
as (4.18)-(4.20).
3. x̄D < x0 < x∗P : Player P preempts Player D.
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4.5

Strategic Flexibility Summary
Under strategic environment, an operator of a flexible system must consider and

react properly to both the stochastic circumstance and other decision makers behavior. This chapter extended the environments considered in Chapter 3 to strategic
environments including the interactions between decision makers. Duopoly market
share competition was employed in this chapter to clarify the context of option exercise games. This research interpreted an exclusive patent as flexibility without
exercise delay, and R&D opportunity as that with exercise delay. Section 4.3 modeled the asymmetric option exercise game when the exercise delay is fixed, and Section
4.4 considered a stochastic exercise delay.
In the open loop model, the game yields unique dominant strategy equilibrium,
and the profitability of each technology decides who exercises the option first. For
the closed loop model, this research suggested a strategy space with respect to the
running maximum, the running minimum and the current state of the stochastic
factor. Based on the construction of strategy space, this dissertation successfully
assessed the closed loop equilibria of the option exercise game. When the asymmetry
between the players is large, the closed loop equilibrium is identical to the open
loop equilibrium. However, if the short exercise delay does not provide a sufficient
competitive advantage, both players exercise their option earlier than the case of large
asymmetry. Moreover, in this case the expected payoffs of the players are lower than
the large asymmetry case.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The primary objectives of this dissertation were developing a concrete framework for
designing a flexible system by considering the exercise delay as a measure of flexibility
and investigating the rational behaviors of decision makers who operate flexible systems under strategic environments. The general approach employed to develop the
theoretical models for this dissertation included the optimal control theory, non-linear
optimization, stochastic differential equation and game theory. The impact of exercise delay as a measure of flexibility was investigated with respect to operational level
and design level under a stochastic environment. By deriving a comprehensive profile
of optimal operational policies of a flexible system with exercise delay and identifying the interdependency of design and operational level decisions, a well-organized
concrete framework to solve the design level problem was developed. Moreover, the
impact of interactions between decision makers who manage a flexible system was
studied under both the open loop and the closed loop information structures. The
derived equilibria provided insights into a market share competition under stochastic
duopoly market.
This chapter summarizes the research conducted in this dissertation, highlights
the contributions to the current literature and proposes potential extensions for future
research.

5.1

Summary
This study considered two distinct environments, stochastic and strategic envi-

ronments, of a flexible system. The models for each environments focused on exercise
delay as the essential component of flexibility.
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5.1.1

Designing a Flexible System under Stochastic Environment

The first part of this research was presented in Chapter 3 and studied the optimal
decisions on a flexible system with exercise delay within stochastic environments. The
model postulates two level decisions, operational level and design level decisions.
The first model of this chapter assumed that the operational level problem is
deciding the optimal time to exercise the designed option, and the design problem
is choosing the optimal level of flexibility, i.e., the length of exercise delay. The
operational level problem was modeled as a delayed optimal stopping time problem,
and this research provided a comprehensive profile of the optimal operational policies.
The profile provides a guideline for optimal operational policies according to the
parameters representing the market conditions and characteristics of the alternative
and designed features of the flexible system. Leveraging a general approach developed
in optimal control theory, the first goal of this research, successful derivation of the
operational level solution, was accomplished.
In addition, the profile elucidates the interdependence between the operational
level decision and the design level decision separating the entire domain of the design
problem into sub-regions. This finding contributes to the area of flexible systems
engineering. By analyzing the characteristics of the design problem in each sub-region,
this research effort found that the design problem is decomposable with well-behaved
non-linear optimization problems. With an illustrative example, the usefulness of the
developed framework was shown.
The second model of Chapter 3 expanded the previous model by including the
extent of capability change in the design level decision variables. The possible choices
of the capability change included expanding the capability, reducing the capability,
terminating the operation of flexible system and staying the initial mode forever. The
inclusive optimal operational policy developed with the previous model was utilized
to assess the operational level solution. Following the similar process of the previous
model, the interdependence between the two level problems was also confirmed for
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this model. With a careful examination of the possible singularity, this research
showed that the design problem of the extended model is also decomposable, and
another illustrative example is provided to clarify the usefulness of the suggested
flexible system design framework.

5.1.2

Management of Flexible System in Duopoly Market

Strategic environments force a decision maker to cope with both exogenous uncertainty and endogenous interactions among decision makers. Investigating decision
makers’ rational behaviors in equilibrium was another main goal of this dissertation.
As the strategic environment, a duopoly market share competition was postulated
where the total market profit was regarded as the underlying uncertainty. The player
retaining an exclusive patent was regarded as a player competing in the market with
a flexible system that does not have exercise delay. The other competitor was interpreted as a player operating a flexible system with exercise delay.
Because two types of exercise delay and the two types of information structure
were considered in this dissertation, four equilibria were derived. This research effort
stared with a fixed exercise delay model and evolved into the model with a stochastic
exercise delay. The open loop and closed loop information structures were considered
for each model. The results showed that the open loop equilibria are unique dominant
strategy equilibria in both of the models with respect to exercise delay. An interesting
implication of the open loop equilibria was the profitability of flexible option decides
the role of its owner in the duopoly market competition.
Although construction of an appropriate strategy space is a premise of deriving closed loop equilibrium, a satisfactory strategy space has not yet reported for a
stochastic preemption games. Bearing in mind the strategy space for deterministic
preemption games, the author suggested strategy space that is adapted to the set of
cumulated information up to the present time of the game. With the suggested strat-
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egy space, the closed loop equilibria were described properly. This is a contribution
of this research effort to the area of option exercise games.
This research found that the closed loop equilibrium has two distinctive forms.
When the asymmetry of exercise delay is small, the closed loop equilibrium is identical
to the open loop equilibrium. On the other hand, if the asymmetry provides a large
enough advantage to the player who has a flexible option with no exercise delay,
the rational behaviors of the players are complicated in the closed loop equilibrium.
Comparing the closed loop equilibrium with the open loop equilibrium, this research
discovered the following interesting insights.
1. The closed loop information structure hastens the execution of flexible options,
and it results in lower payoffs to both of the players.
2. The role of each player is determined not only by the characteristics of the
flexible options but also by the value of stochastic factor.
3. Even the player with a competitive disadvantage from the asymmetry has a
positive chance to be the leader of the market.

5.2

Future Work
The author summarizes the possible extensions to this research effort as follows:

1. This research mainly focused on theoretical development of flexible systems
management under stochastic and strategic environments. However, the developed models are applicable in many practical contexts with minor modifications.
The illustrative examples in Chapter 3 and the context employed in Chapter
4 showed the application potentials of this research. Moreover, the constructive frameworks of this research are useful to find insights from the real world
problems. For example, this dissertation reported closed form solutions for the
operational level problem of flexible system management under stochastic envi-
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ronments. If this result is applied to a real world problem, it can make sensitive
analysis easily
2. The stochastic process X(t) was assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
and employed to represent the underlying uncertainty of the flexible systems.
However, this assumption may not be appropriate to model all underlying uncertainties. Especially, the assumed stochastic process satisfies the strong Markov
property. If the underlying uncertainty does not satisfy the property, the theorem, which this research heavily relied on for deriving the optimal operational
policy of delayed flexible system, does not hold. Furthermore, when the underlying uncertainty is not Markov, empowerment to the system operator can be
an interesting research topic. For example, it can be more efficient for system
designer to set the range of exercise delay in which the system operator decides
the specific exercise delay when he or she exercises the flexible option, instead
of setting a fixed length of delay.
3. The flexible systems considered in this dissertation allowed only one change of
to the system configuration over the life time of the flexible system. If a flexible system allows multiple changes, an appropriate numerical method may be
required to solve the problem. For example, this extension would explain the
automation flexibility. Once an automated system is established, the change
within the embedded alternatives can occur frequently. Unfortunately, the results in this dissertation have limits to assess the frequently changing flexible
system, especially computation-wise. Investigation of the practical methods for
the frequently changing flexible system would be an interesting extension of this
research.
4. The flexible options were implicitly assumed to have infinite life time, i.e., as
long as the irreversible change of the system has not been made, it is possible
to change the system whenever the system operator wants. However, in reality
many of the opportunities disappear within a certain amount of time. When
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the flexible option is perishable, the operational problem does not yield a useful
closed form solution. Investigating a flexible system whose alternatives are
available for limited time is an interesting research topic.
5. The closed loop equilibrium derived in this dissertation was unique with the
assumption that players exercise their options at the outset of a game if the
game starts with a high initial state. However, other closed loop equilibria are
reported for both stochastic and deterministic preemption games when both of
the players payoff structures and available strategies are identical. The studies
showed that it is equilibrium that both of the players wait until the state variable
increased to very high state. Yet, for asymmetric option exercise games, the
existence of other closed loop equilibrium is still matter of study.
6. There could be the first movers advantage or the second movers advantage. In
terms of flexible option, the first movers advantage implies that the gain from
exercising the flexible option ahead of the competitor is greater than the gain
from following the competitor. If there is the first movers advantage, no useful
closed form solution of option exercise policy has been reported for asymmetric
exercise delay case. Even an appropriate numerical method for this problem
is still under research. Obstacle problem approach and front tracking method
are the current candidates for the numerical method. Since the first movers
advantage exists in many of the real world situations, this could be a valuable
research topic.
7. This dissertation does not consider design problems under strategic environments. It is mainly for two reasons. The first reason is the possible existence of
multiple equilibria. The other reason is difficulties of constructing design level
games. When there are multiple equilibria, it may be challenging to assess which
equilibrium will be attained. Moreover there must be interactions in the design
phase. The players can acquire a flexible system without exercise delay through
an auction, or through a negotiation with the system seller. The mechanism to
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acquire the flexible system is also open to research. An integrated approach for
both the operational level option exercise games and design level game would
contribute to the research areas of option exercise games and flexible decision
making.
These contributions will impact decision making with flexible systems.

APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF THEOREMS
A.1

Proof of Theorem 3.3.1

Proof Let fi (t, X(t)) = e−ρt (ai X(t) + bi ) for i = 1, 2 and
Z ∞

a2
b2
x
f2 (t, X(t))dt = −
x+
G(x) = E
µ−ρ
ρ
0
Then
i
f
(t,
X(t))dt
τ +δ 2
hR
i
τ
+δ
= supτ Ex 0 f1 (t, X(t)) − f2 (t, X(t))dt + e−ρ(τ +δ) c̃(δ) + G(x)

v(x, δ) = supτ Ex

hR

τ +δ
0

f1 (t, X(t))dt + e−ρ(τ +δ) c̃(δ) +

R∞

Let f1 (t, X(t)) − f2 (t, X(t)) = e−ρt (aX(t) + b), where a = a1 − a2 , b = b1 − b2 ,
i
hR
τ +δ
Ex 0 f1 (t, X(t)) − f2 (t, X(t))dt + e−ρ(τ +δ) c̃(δ)
i
hR
τ +δ
= Ex 0 e−ρt (aX(t) + b)dt + e−ρ(τ +δ) c̃(δ)
By [129, Theorem 2.1], The delayed optimal stopping time problem can be transformed to a classic optimal stopping time problem without delay based on Markov
property as follows:
hR
i
τ +δ
supτ Ex 0 e−ρt (aX(t) + b)dt + e−ρ(τ +δ) c̃(δ)
ii
hR
hR
δ −ρt
τ −ρt
−ρδ
x
x
= supτ E
e (aX(t) + b)dt + E
e (aX(t) + b)dt + e c̃(δ) x = X(τ )
0
0
R

τ
= supτ Ex 0 e−ρt (aX(t) + b)dt + eρτ (F1 X(τ ) + F2 )
where F1 = a(e(µ−ρ)δ − 1)/(µ − ρ) and F2 = (b/ρ)(1 − e−ρδ ) + e−ρδ c̃(δ). Therefore,
v(x, δ) = ṽ(x, δ) + G(x)

(A.1)

where
x

Z

ṽ(x, δ) = sup E
τ

τ

e
0

−ρt


(aX(t) + b)dt + e (F1 X(τ ) + F2 )
ρτ

(A.2)
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The solution of equation (A.2) can be found using the approach of [128, Chapter
10]. Let S = {(x, τ ) ∈ (0, ∞) × (0, ∞)} be the solvency region. Define an operator
for a function of s and x, A :=

∂
∂s

2

∂
∂
+ µx ∂x
+ 21 σ 2 x2 ∂x
2 , based on Ito’s formula. Let

h1 (s, x) := e−ρs (ax + b) and h2 (s, x) := e−ρs (F1 x + F2 ). Consider the set U =
{(x, τ ) ∈ (0, ∞) × (0, ∞)|A(h2 ) + h1 > 0}
A(h2 ) + h1 = −ρe−ρs (F1 x + F2 ) + µxe−ρs F1 + e−ρs (ax + b)

= e−ρ(s+δ) aeµδ x − ρc̃(δ) + b
Therefore U = {(x, τ ) ∈ (0, ∞) × (0, ∞)|A(h2 ) + h1 > 0}

= (x, τ ) ∈ (0, ∞) × (0, ∞) ax > e−µδ (ρc̃(δ) − b) . We can consider the following
cases.
1. a > 0 and c̃(δ) ≤ b/ρ
ax > e−µδ (ρc̃(δ) − b) ⇔ x >

e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ) − b)
a

This means U = S, because above inequality is satisfied ∀x ∈ (0, ∞). Therefore,
the flexible option should not be exercised [157, Proposition 2.3 and Proposition
2.4].
2. a < 0 and c̃(δ) ≥ b/ρ
ax > e−µδ (ρc̃(δ) − b) ⇔ x <

e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ) − b)
a

In this case U = ∅. Then exercising option immediately is optimal.
3. a > 0 and c̃(δ) > b/ρ
e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ) − b)
a
n
o
−µδ
It means U = (s, x) x > e a (ρc̃(δ) − b) > 0 . The continuation region D has
ax > e−µδ (ρc̃(δ) − b) ⇔ x >

the form
D = {(s, x)|x∗ < x}
for some x∗ that satisfies 0 < x∗ ≤

e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ)
a

− b).
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4. a < 0 and c̃(δ) ≤ b/ρ
e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ) − b)
a
n
o
e−µδ
In this case, U = (s, x) 0 < x < a (ρc̃(δ) − b) . The continuation region D
ax > e−µδ (ρc̃(δ) − b) ⇔ x <

has the form
D = {(s, x)|0 < x < x∗ }
for some x∗ that satisfies 0 <

e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ)
a

− b) ≤ x∗

Let v∞ (x) denote the value of system when never exercising the flexible option is
optimal given X(0) = x and δ.
R ∞
v∞ (x) = Ex 0 aX(t) + bdt + G(x)
R∞
= 0 a1 Ex [X(t)] + b1 dt
a1
= − µ−ρ
x+

(A.3)

b1
ρ

Let v0 (x, δ) represent the value of the flexible system when immediate exercise of
the flexible option is optimal given X(0) = x and δ.
nR
o
δ
−ρδ
x
aX(t) + bdt + e c̃(δ) + G(x)
v0 (x, δ) = E
0
Rδ x
= 0 aE [X(t)] + bdt + e−ρδ c̃(δ) + G(x)
=

ae(µ−ρ)δ −a1
x
µ−ρ

+

b1 −be−ρδ
ρ

(A.4)

+ e−ρδ c̃(δ)

In the case that a < 0 and c̃(δ) ≤ b/ρ, the solution of (A.2) satisfies [128, Theorem
10.4.1], and φ(s, x) = e−ρs ψ(x) is a well-known candidate for the solution of (A.2).
By the condition (vii) of [128, Theorem 10.4.1],
1
Aφ+h1 = −ρe−ρs ψ(x)+µxe−ρs ψ 0 (x)+ σ 2 x2 e−ρs ψ 00 (x)+e−ρs (ax+b) = 0,
2

∀(s, x) ∈ D

Equivalently,
1
−ρψ(x) + µxψ 0 (x) + σ 2 x2 ψ 00 (x) + ax + b = 0,
2

∀(s, x) ∈ D

Let ψ0 (x) be the solution of homogeneous ordinary differential equation
1
−ρψ0 (x) + µxψ00 (x) + σ 2 x2 ψ000 (x) = 0
2

(A.5)
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The general solution of above differential equation, Cauchy-Euler equation, is ψ0 (x) =
Λ1 xr1 + Λ2 xr2 , where r1 and r2 are the solutions of the auxiliary equation, u(r) =
−ρ + µr + 21 σ 2 r(r − 1) = 0. Notice that the auxiliary equation has two solutions, r1
and r2 , which satisfy r2 < 0 < 1 < r1 , because u(0) = −ρ < 0, u(1) = µ − ρ < 0
and limr→∞ u(r) > 0. A function ψ1 (x) = λ1 x + λ2 is a candidate of the solution
of non-homogeneous equation, −ρψ1 (x) + µxψ10 (x) + 12 σ 2 x2 ψ100 (x) + ax + b = 0, with
unknown constants λ1 and λ2 .
−ρψ1 (x) + µxψ10 (x) + 21 σ 2 x2 ψ100 (x) + ax + b = 0
{(µ − ρ)λ1 + a}x − ρλ2 + b

=0

a
Therefore, λ1 = − µ−ρ
and λ2 = ρb . Because we are considering a < 0 and c̃(δ) ≤ b/ρ,

and the continuation region D = {(s, x)|0 < x < x∗ }. Since ψ(x) is bounded near
x = 0, the solution of (A.5) has the following form.

 Λ xr1 − a x + b
0 < x < x∗
1
µ−ρ
ρ
ψ(x) =
 F x+F
x∗ ≤ x
1
2

(A.6)

By the condition (i) of [128, Theorem 10.4.1], the continuity and smooth pasting
conditions,
a
b
x∗ + = F1 x∗ + F2
µ−ρ
ρ
a
Λ1 r1 (x∗ )r1 −1 −
= F1
µ−ρ
Λ1 (x∗ )r1 −

(A.7)
(A.8)

By solving above equations,
x∗1 (δ)



r1 (µ − ρ)
b1 − b2
=
− c̃(δ) e−µρ ,
(a1 − a2 )(r1 − 1)
ρ

Λ1 =

ae(µ−ρ)δ ∗ 1−r1
(x )
r1 (µ − ρ) 1

(A.9)

Notice that s is a time shift parameter [128, Section 10.4]. Since the current value
of the system is calculated by setting s = 0. Then φ(0, x) = ψ(x). When a < 0 and
c̃(δ) ≤ b/ρ, the solution of (A.1) is expressed as the follows by plugging (A.9) into
(A.6).


r1
e−ρδ b1 − b2
x
b1
a1 x
vc,1 (x, δ) =
− c̃(δ)
−
+ ,
x∗1 > x (A.10)
∗
r1 − 1
ρ
x1 (δ)
µ−ρ
ρ
(µ−ρ)δ
{(a1 − a2 )e
− a1 }x b1 − b2 −ρδ b1
v0 (x, δ) =
−
e
+ + e−ρδ c̃(δ), x∗1 ≤ x (A.11)
µ−ρ
ρ
ρ
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In the case that a > 0 and c̃(δ) > b/ρ, the continuation region has the form
D = {(s, x)|x∗ < x} for some x∗ which satisfies x∗ ≤
similar procedure of above, the solution of (A.2) is

 F x+F
1
2
ψ(x) =
 Λ xr 2 − a x + b
2

µ−ρ

ρ

e−µδ
(ρc̃(δ)
a

− b). With the

0 < x < x∗
x∗ ≤ x

(A.12)

where
x∗2



r2 (µ − ρ)
=
a(r2 − 1)



b −µδ
c̃(δ) +
e ,
ρ

Λ2 =

ae(µ−ρ)δ ∗ 1−r2
(x )
r2 (µ − ρ)

(A.13)

Therefore, the solution of (A.1) is expressed as the follows.
{(a1 − a2 )e(µ−ρ)δ − a1 }x b1 − b2 −ρδ b1
−
e
+ + e−ρδ c̃(δ), x ≤ x∗2 (A.14)
µ−ρ
ρ
ρ

r2

−ρδ
e
b1 − b2
a1 x
x
b1
vc,2 (x, δ) =
−
− c̃(δ)
+ ,
x > x∗2 (A.15)
∗
r2 − 1
ρ
x2 (δ)
µ−ρ
ρ

v0 (x, δ) =

A.2

Proof of Theorem 3.3.2

Proof Suppose that a1 < a2 and c̃(δ) < (b1 −b2 )/ρ. If X(0) ≥ x∗1 (δ), the operational
value function is v0 (X(0), δ) according to Theorem 3.3.1, and the objective function
of design problem is v0 (X(0), δ) − C(δ) and continuous. Because c̃(δ) is once differentiable, x∗1 (δ) is continuous. Therefore, the level set {δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]|X(0) ≥ x∗1 (δ)}
is compact, and P2 has maximizer. If X(0) < x∗1 (δ), the object function of design
problem is vc,1 (X(0), δ) − C(δ). Because of value matching condition, v0 (X(0), δ) =
vc,1 (X(0), δ), where X(0) = x∗1 (δ). Therefore, vc,1 (X(0), δ) − C(δ) is the objective
function at δ = δ̄ as well. Since the level set {δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]|X(0) ≤ x∗1 (δ)} is compact, P1 has maximizer.
Let ∆ = {δ ∈ [δmin , δmax ]|x∗i (δ) = X(0)}. For δ̄ ∈ ∆, vc,i (X(0), δ̄) = v0 (X(0), δ),
because of the value matching condition. With the similar procedure, the design
problem is decomposed into P1 and P2 in (3.13), in the case that a1 > a2 and c̃(δ) >
(b1 − b2 )/ρ.
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A.3

Proof of Theorem 3.4.2

Proof To proof the optimization problem (3.15) is decomposable into four maximization problems (3.23)-(3.26), it is necessary to show that all the feasible areas are
compact, and all objective functions are continuous.
Notice that x∗i (δ, ζ) is continuous on A \ {(δ, ζ)|ζ = 1}. Using the L’Hôpital’s rule,
by setting
"
r
(µ
−
ρ)
b
∂c̃(δ, ζ)
i
x∗i (δ, 1) =
+
a(ri − 1) ρ
∂ζ

#
e−µδ

(A.16)

ζ=1

, the threshold values, x∗i (δ, ζ) is continuous on A. Since the threshold value has
meanings when it is positive, this setting is required only when

b
ρ

+

∂c̃(δ,ζ)
∂ζ

< 0.
ζ=1

With this setting, the feasible areas of all the sub-problems are compact, because a
level set of a continuous function on a compact domain is also compact.
To investigate possible singularities, let ∆ = {(δ, ζ) ∈ A|x∗i (δ, ζ) = X(0)}, where
A = [δmin , δmax ] × [ζmin , ζmax ]. If ζ ∈ [ζmin , 1) and X(0) ≤ x∗2 (δ, ζ), the objective function of design problem is v0 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ). Notice that limζ↑1 v0 (X(0), δ, ζ) =
a
X(0)
ρ−µ

+ ρb . Therefore the objective function of (3.23) is continuous on A. With

the same procedure, the objective function of (3.26) is also continuous on its feasible
area.
For (3.24), if ζ ∈ [ζmin , 1) and X(0) > x∗2 (δ, ζ), the objective function of design
problem is vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) − C(δ, ζ) and continuous on this open set. Because of
the value matching condition, vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) is continuous at (δ, ζ) ∈ ∆. If
∂c̃(δ,ζ)
∂ζ

ζ=1

b
ρ

+

≥ 0, A does not contain ζ = 1. Therefore, vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) is continuous

on the feasible area. On the other hand, if

b
ρ

+

∂c̃(δ,ζ)
∂ζ

< 0, with the fictitious
ζ=1

threshold value defined at (A.16) limζ↑1 vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) =

a
X(0)
ρ−µ

+ ρb . Therefore

vc,2 (X(0), δ, ζ) is continuous. The proof for (3.25) is almost identical to this proof.
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A.4

Proof of Theorem 4.3.1

Proof Player P ’s decision problem at the outset of the market share competition is
h
i
sup E J˜P (τP |τD , x0 )
τP
Z ∞

x0
−ρt
−ρτP
= sup E
e KP X(t)dt − e
IP
τP
τP
Z ∞

Z τD +δ
−ρt
−ρt
x0
e (1 − π0 − KD )X(t)dt +
e KD X(t)dt
+E
0

0

Following calculations of expected discount factors are useful to prove this theorems. Let τ be the first hitting time of the stochastic process X(t) given in (4.1) to
a trigger point X ∗ , i.e., τ = inf{t ≥ 0|X(t) = X ∗ }.

  x0  r 1
Ex0 e−ρτ =
X∗ 



x0 r 2
Ex0 e−ρτ =
X∗

Z τ
x0
(X ∗ )1−r1 r1
x0
−ρt
x0 −
E
e X(t)dt =
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
0

Z τ +δ
(µ−ρ)δ
∗ 1−r1
e
(X )
x0
Ex0
e−ρt X(t)dt =
xr01 −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
0

X ∗ > x0

(A.17)

X ∗ < x0

(A.18)

X ∗ > x0

(A.19)

X ∗ > x0

(A.20)

The proofs of (A.17) and (A.19) are in [1, Page 315-316]. Because the proof of
(A.18) and (A.20) are similar to the cited proof, the sketch of proof is enough. Let
f (x) := E [e−ρτ ]. Then f (x) satisfies
1
−ρf (x) + µxf 0 (x) + σ 2 x2 f 00 (x) = 0,
2
hR
i
τ +δ
Let f (x) := E 0 e−ρt X(t)dt , then

f (X ∗ ) = 1,

lim f (x) = 0

x→∞

1
− ρf (x) + µxf 0 (x) + σ 2 x2 f 00 (x) + f (x) = 0
2

Z δ
e(µ−ρ)δ − 1 ∗
∗
−ρt
f (0) = 0, f (X ) = E
e X(t)dt =
X
µ−ρ
0
By solving above ordinary differential equations, (A.18) and (A.20) are obtained.
R ∞

−KD )x0
Notice that Ex0 0 e−ρt (1 − π0 − KD )X(t)dt = − (1−π0µ−ρ
. Using (A.20),
Z τD +δ

 (µ−ρ)δ 1−r1

e
xD
x0
r1
x0
−ρt
E
e KD X(t)dt = KD
x0 −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
0
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where xD is the trigger value of Player D to start R&D project. The decision problem,
Z ∞

−ρt
−ρτP
x0
e KP X(t)dt − e
IP
sup E
τP

τP

is a special case of Theorem 3.3.1 with a1 = 0, a2 = KP ≥ 0, b1 = b2 = 0, c̃(δ) = −IP
and δ = 0. Therefore,
sup Ex0

∞

Z

τP

e−ρt KP X(t)dt − e−ρτP IP



τP


 −IP − KP x0 x0 ≥ x∗
P
 µ−ρ
r1
=
x0
 IP
x0 < x∗P
r1 −1 x∗

(A.21)

P

where x∗P =

r1 (µ−ρ)IP
.
−KP (r1 −1)

By summing up all terms and rearranging them,

(µ−ρ)δ x1−r1
KP
0
D
h
i  KD e
xr01 − µ−ρ
x0 − IP − 1−π
x x0 ≥ x∗P
µ−ρ
µ−ρ 0
˜
h
i
sup E JP (τP |τD , x0 ) =
1−r
 IP (x∗P )−r1 + KD e(µ−ρ)δ xD 1 xr1 − 1−π0 x0 x0 < x∗
τP
0
P
r1 −1
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
(A.22)
Player D’s decision problem at the beginning of the game is
h
i
sup E J˜D (τD |τP , x0 )
τD

Z ∞
x0
−ρt
−ρτD
e KD X(t)dt − e
ID
= sup E
τD
τD +δ

Z ∞
Z τP
x0
−ρt
−ρt
+E
e (π0 − KP )X(t)dt +
e KP X(t)dt
0

0

R ∞


P )x0
e−ρt (π0 − KP )X(t)dt = − (π0 −K
. Using (A.19),
µ−ρ


Z τP
 1−r1
x0
xP
r1
x0
−ρt
E
e KP X(t)dt = KP
x −
µ−ρ 0
µ−ρ
0

Notice that Ex0

0

where xP is the threshold value of Player P to implement the patent protected technology. Since
x0

Z

∞

sup E
τD

e

−ρt

KD X(t)dt − e

−ρτD


ID

τD +δ

is a special case of Theorem 3.3.1 with a1 = 0, a2 = KD ≥ 0, b1 = b2 = 0 and
c̃(δ) = −ID eρδ ,
sup Ex0
τD

Z

∞

τD +δ

e−ρt KD X(t)dt − e−ρτD ID




 −ID − KD e(µ−ρ)δ x0 x0 ≥ x∗
D
 µ−ρ
=
r
∗
 ID x∗0 1
x0 < xD
r1 −1 xD
(A.23)
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where x∗D =

ID e−(µ−ρ)δ (µ−ρ)r1
.
−KD (r1 −1)

By summing up all terms and rearranging them,


i  KP (xP )1−r1 xr1 − KD e(µ−ρ)δ x0 − ID − π0 x0 x0 ≥ x∗
0
D
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
i
h µ−ρ
sup E J˜D (τD |τP , x0 ) =
∗ )−r1
1−r1
I
(x
K
(x
)
r
D
π
P

0
D
τD
+ P µ−ρ
x01 − µ−ρ
x0
x0 < x∗D
r1 −1
(A.24)
h

Because the optimal threshold values, x∗P and x∗D , are independent from the other
player’s behavior, each player has dominant strategy. If x0 ≥ x∗D , then xD = x0 ,
otherwise xD = x∗D in (A.22). Similarly, if x0 ≥ x∗P , then xP = x0 , otherwise xP = x∗P
in (A.24).

A.5

Proof of Theorem 4.3.2

Proof Let f (x) = DF (x) − DL (x) for x ∈ [0, x∗P ].




IP r1
ID
KP + KD e(µ−ρ)δ
r1
+
x +
x + ID
f (x) =
(r1 − 1)(x∗D )r1 (r1 − 1)(x∗P )r1
µ−ρ
The first order condition, f 0 (x) = 0, is satisfied at




KP + KD e(µ−ρ)δ
r1 − 1
ID
IP r1
∗ r1 −1
(x )
=−
·
+
µ−ρ
r1
(x∗D )r1 (x∗P )r1
Because f 00 (x) > 0 at x = x∗ , if f (x∗ ) > 0, then DF (x) > DL (x). This condition
is rewritten as (4.11). Figure A.5 represents the structure of terminal payoffs of the
players when the patent provides a large advantage to Player P .
Let xt denote the initial state of the sub-game starting at time t. Unless xt < x∗P ,
either of the players will exercise the option at the outset of the sub-game according
to the open loop equilibrium strategy. Hence, the interest of this proof is the case
that xt < x∗P .
Since DL (x) < DF (x), ∀x < x∗P < x∗D , Player D has no incentive to exercise the
option as the leader when X(s) < x∗D . As proved in Theorem 4.3.1, it is optimal
to exercise the delayed option at the time X(t) = x∗D . Therefore, GtD (s) = 0 when
M t (s) < x∗D , and GtD (s) = 1 when M t (s) ≥ x∗D . Because the optimality does not
depend on Player P ’s action, qD (s) = 0 when X(s) < x∗D , and qD (s) = 1 when
X(s) ≥ x∗D .
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Figure A.1. Payoffs Comparison with Large Asymmetry

The Player D’s strategy implies that Player P does not fear being preempted in
the region of [0, x∗D ). It is obvious that Player P never exercise his or her option for
X(s) < xP , since PL (X(s)) < PF (X(s)). Define PLxt (xs ) be the player P ’s payoff as
the leader of the sub-game that starts with initial state xt ∈ [xP , x∗P ) and ends when
X(t) = xs . Suppose that xs > xt . Then,
 R

R ∞ −ρu
∞ −ρu
e
(1
−
π
)X(u)du
+
e
K
X(u)du
0
P
τP

PLxt (xs ) = Ext  t
R∞
−ρu
− τ ∗ +δ e KD X(u)du
 r1 
 D r1

xt
ID r1
xs
KP
1 − π0
=
−
−
xs − IP −
xt
∗
xs
r1 − 1 xD
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
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where τP = inf{s ≥ t|X(u) ≥ xs } and τD∗ = inf{s ≥ t|X(u) ≥ x∗D }. Using the first
and the second order conditions, PLxt (xs ) is maximized at
x∗s =

r1 IP (µ − ρ)
= x∗P
KP (1 − r1 )

(A.25)

If xP < xs < xt ,

PLxt (xs )


=

xt
xs

r2 

ID r1
−
r1 − 1



xs
x∗D

r1


1 − π0
KP
xs − IP −
xt
−
µ−ρ
µ−ρ

≤ PLxt (xt )
Therefore, without preemption threat from Player D, it is optimal for Player P
to exercise the option when X(s) hits x∗P . This results are summarized as Theorem
4.3.2 with respect to the simple strategy,.

A.6

Proof of Theorem 4.3.3

Proof Figure A.6 illustrates the terminal payoff structure when Player P retains
a small advantage from procuring the patent. Let xt denote the initial state of the
sub-game starting at time t, which satisfies xt < x∗P . Suppose that xt ∈ [0, xD ) and
M t (s) ≤ xD for s ≥ t. It is obvious that GtD (s) = 0 and qD (s) = 0, because being
the follower yields higher payoff than being the leader for Player D. With the same
reason, if xt ∈ (x̄D , x∗D ), mt (s) > x̄D and M t (s) ≤ x∗P , GtD (s) = 0 and qD (s) = 0. For
Player P , if xt ∈ [0, xP ) and M t (s) < xP , GtP (s) = 0 and qP (s) = 0.
For max (xP , xD ) ≤ xt ≤ x̄D , it is optimal for both of the players to exercise the
option immediately with positive intensities [151, Chapter 12]. Thus GtP (s) = 1 and
GxDt (s) = 1. Since both players have positive Gti (s), they play the game with intensity
functions. Given qP (xt ) and qD (xt ), the probability that Player P becomes the leader
is given as
P(Leader=P ) (xt ) =

qP (xt )(1 − qD (xt ))
qP (xt ) + qD (xt ) − qP (xt )qD (xt )
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Figure A.2. Payoffs Comparison with Small Asymmetry

Similarly,
qD (xt )(1 − qP (xt ))
qP (xt ) + qD (xt ) − qP (xt )qD (xt )
qD (xt )qP (xt )
P(Simultaneous Investment) (xt ) =
qP (xt ) + qD (xt ) − qP (xt )qD (xt )
P(Leader=D) (xt ) =

The value of each player is expressed as
{qP (1 − qD )}PL (xt ) + {qD (1 − qP )}PF (xt ) + {qD qP }PM (xt )
qP + q D − qP q D
{qD (1 − qP )}DL (xt ) + {qP (1 − qD )}DF (xt ) + {qD qP }DM (xt )
VD (xt , qP , qD ) =
qP + qD − qP qD
VP (xt , qP , qD ) =
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By taking the first derivative,
∂
VP (xt , qP , qD ) > 0,
∂qP
∂
VP (xt , qP , qD ) < 0,
∂qP
∂
VD (xt , qP , qD ) > 0,
∂qD
∂
VD (xt , qP , qD ) < 0,
∂qD

PL (xt ) − PF (xt )
PL (xt ) − PM (xt )
PL (xt ) − PF (xt )
if qD (xt ) >
PL (xt ) − PM (xt )
DL (xt ) − DF (xt )
if qP (xt ) <
DL (xt ) − DM (xt )
DL (xt ) − DF (xt )
if qP (xt ) >
DL (xt ) − DM (xt )
if qD (xt ) <

∗
Figure A.3 shows the best response functions qP∗ and qD
. Therefore the equilibrium
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Figure A.3. Best Response Intensity Functions

is obtained at
DL (xt ) − DF (xt )
DL (xt ) − DM (xt )
PL (xt ) − DF (xt )
qD (xt ) =
PL (xt ) − PM (xt )
qP (xt ) =

Consider the case that xP < xt < xD . Player P does not fear to be preempted by
Player D as long as M (s) ≤ xD . As shown in A.5, it is optimal for Player P to wait
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until X(s) hits x∗P given no preemption threat from Player D. However, Player D has
incentive to exercise its option when X(s) ≥ xD because qD (X(s)) > 0. Therefore,
Player P is able to postpone the implementation until xD − ε for arbitrary small
ε > 0.
Suppose that xD < xt < xP . As long as M (s) ≤ xP , Player D is not afraid of
being preempted by Player P . Let DLxt (xs ) represent Player D’s payoff as the leader of
the sub-game that starts with initial state xt and is terminated when X(t) = xs ≥ xt .
Z ∞
Z ∞
Z ∞
xt
−ρt
−ρt
DL (xs ) =
e π0 X(t)dt −
e−ρt KD X(t)dt
e KP X(t)dt +
0
τ
τD +δ
  r1 h
 Pr1
i
(µ−ρ)δ
IP r1
KD e
π0
xs
 xt
−
−
x
−
I
− µ−ρ
xt xs ≥ xt
∗
s
D
xs
r1 −1 xP
µ−ρ


h


i
=
r2
r1
r1
e(µ−ρ)δ
π0
xs
 xt
− rI1P−1
− KDµ−ρ
xs − ID − µ−ρ
xt xs ≤ xt
xs
x∗
P

Remark that if xD ≤ xs ≤ xt , DLxt (xt ) ≥ DLxt (xs ), and d/dxs DLxt (xs ) > 0, ∀xs ∈
(xt , x∗D ). Therefore, it is optimal for Player D to exercise the delayed option at
xP − ε, due to Player P ’s preemption threat in X(s) ≥ xP .
When x̄D < x0 < x∗P , Player P is not afraid of being preempted, because Player D
has no incentive to be the leader in this region. Therefore Player P can maximize his
or her payoff by waiting until X(t) hits the optimal threshold value x∗P . However, if
Player P does not exercise the option until X(t) becomes less or equal to x̄D , Player
D has incentive to move first, and it is not desirable to Player P . Hence, Player P
exercises his or her option right before X(t) ≤ x̄D .
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A.7

Proof of Theorem 4.4.1

Proof Based on the performance function (4.21), Player P ’s decision problem is
sup E [JP (τP |τD , x0 )]
τP
Z ∞

−ρt
−ρτP
= sup E
e KP X(t)dt − e
IP
τP
τP
"Z
Z
∞

e−ρt (1 − π0 − KD )X(t)dt +

+E

τD +δ(γ)

#
e−ρt KD X(t)dt

0

0

As shown in A.21,
∞

Z

e−ρt KP X(t)dt − e−ρτP IP

sup E
τP

τP




 −IP − KP x0 x0 ≥ x∗
P
 µ−ρ
r1
=
x0
∗
 IP
x0 < xP
r1 −1 x∗
P

P
where x∗P = − r(r1 (µ−ρ)I
.
1 −1)KP

Player D’s decision problem is
sup E [JD (τD |τP , x0 )]
τD
"Z
∞

e−ρt KP X(t)dt −

= sup E
τD

τD +δ(γ)

e

+E

−ρt

Z

e−ρt KP X(t)dt −

τD +δ(γ)
−ρτD

−ρt

e


KP X(t)dt

0

∞

Z

τP

(1 − π0 − KP )X(t)dt +

Focusing on the relevant part,
"Z


e−ρt cdt

τD

0

τD

#

τD +δ(γ)

∞

Z

sup E

Z

Z

τD +δ(γ)

#
e−ρt cdt

τD
∞
−ρt

−(ρ+γ)t

−(ρ+γ)t

e KD X(t) − e
KD X(t) − e
=E e
E
0

r1 

x0
γKD
c
=
X(τD ) −
X(τD )
(µ − ρ)(µ − ρ − γ)
ρ+γ


cdt X(τD )

Using the first and second order conditions,
x∗D =

cr1 (µ − ρ)(µ − ρ − γ)
γKD (r1 − 1)(ρ + γ)

(A.26)
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY CALCULATIONS AND NUMERICAL
RESULTS
B.1

Calculation of Terminal Payoffs with Fixed R&D Period and Cost

When both players exercise their options simultaneously,
Z ∞

Z ∞
x
−ρt
−ρt
PM (x) = E
e (1 − π0 + KP )X(t)dt −
e KD X(t)dt − IP
0

δ

KD
1 − π0 + K P
x+
xe(µ−ρ)δ − IP
=−
µ−ρ
µ−ρ


KD e(µ−ρ)δ − KP
1 − π0
=
x − IP −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
Z ∞

Z ∞
x
−ρt
−ρt
DM (x) = E
e (π0 − KP )X(t)dt +
e KD X(t)dt − ID
0

δ

π0 − K P
KD
=−
x−
xe(µ−ρ)δ − ID
µ−ρ
µ−ρ


KP − KD e(µ−ρ)δ
π0
=
x
x − ID −
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
The first derivatives of PM (x) and DM (x) are positive constants because of the assumptions 0 ≤ π0 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ KD ≤ 1 − π0 and 0 ≤ KP ≤ π0 . Therefore PM (x) and
DM (x) are upward straight lines with respect to x.
Suppose that Player P introduces a new product, when X(t) = x, before Player
D launches the R&D project. Then the Player D’s decision problem becomes

Z ∞
Z ∞
x
−ρt
−ρτD
−ρt
DF (x) = sup E
e (π0 − KP )X(t) − e
ID +
e KD X(t)dt
τD
0
τD +δ
Z ∞

π0 − K P
x
−ρt
−ρτD
= sup E
e KD X(t)dt − e
ID −
x
µ−ρ
τD
τD +δ

 −ID − KD e(µ−ρ)δ x − π0 −KP x x ≥ x∗
D
µ−ρ
 µ−ρ
=
r1
x
 ID
− π0 −KP x
x < x∗
∗
r1 −1

xD

µ−ρ

D
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where x∗D =

ID e−(µ−ρ)δ (µ−ρ)r1
.
−KD (r1 −1)

The last equality holds by (A.23), and DF (x) = DM (x)

when x ≥ x∗D . Consider the first and the second derivatives of DF (x).
d
ID r1 ∗ −r1 r1 −1 π0 − KP
DF (x) =
(x ) x
−
dx
r1 − 1 D
µ−ρ
2
d
ID r1 (r1 − 1) ∗ −r1 r1 −1
(xD ) x
D
(x)
=
F
dx2
r1 − 1
These derivatives are positive for x ∈ [0, x∗D ), because r1 > 1, µ − ρ < 0,ID > 0 and
0 ≤ KP ≤ π0 . Therefore DF (x) is an increasing and convex function with respect to
x.
If Player P exercises his or her option when X(t) = x ≥ x∗D , Player D will starts
R&D project immediately. Therefore, PL (x) = PM (x) for x ≥ x∗D . Given x < x∗D ,
PL (x) is
x

Z

∞
−ρt

PL (x) = E

e

Z
(1 − π0 + KP )X(t)dt − IP −

Z

e

−ρt


KD X(t)dt

τD +δ

0
x

∞

∞

Z

−ρt

τD +δ

−ρt


KD X(t)dt

e
(1 − π0 + KP − KD )X(t)dt − IP +
0
 r1
KD e(µ−ρ)δ ∗
x
KD
1 − π0 + K P − K D
− IP +
xD
x
=−
−
∗
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
xD
µ−ρ
 r1
1 − π0
ID r1
x
KP
x − IP −
x
=−
−
∗
r1 − 1 xD
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
=E

e

0

The second last equality is obtained by applying (A.20), and plugging x∗D into the
second last line yields the last line. Notice that

d2
P (x)
dx2 L

= −ID (r1 )2 (x∗D )−r1 xr1 −2 for

0 ≤ x < x∗D because x∗P > 0 and ID > 0. Hence, PL (x) is concave for x < x∗D .
The other terminal values are expressed as the followings.
 R

R ∞ −ρt
∞ −ρt
e (1 − π0 )X(t)dt − δ e KD X(t)dt

PF (x) = sup Ex  0
R∞
τP
−IP e−ρτP + τP e−ρt KP X(t)dt
Z ∞

Z ∞
Z ∞
x
−ρt
−ρt
−ρt
DL (x) = E
e π0 X(t)dt +
e KD X(t)dt − ID −
e KP X(t)dt
0

δ

τP

With similar procedure, (4.4), (4.7) and their properties are obtained.
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B.2

Calculation of Terminal Payoffs with Stochastic R&D Period and
Cost

"Z

∞

e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP − KD )X(t)dt − IP +

PM (x) = E
0

Z

#

δ(γ)

e−ρt KD X(t)dt

0

Z ∞

KD
1 − π0 + K P
−(ρ+γ)t
x0 − IP +
x0 + E
e
KD X(t)dt
=−
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
0


γKD
1 − π0 + K P
−
x0 − IP
= −
µ−ρ
(µ − ρ − γ)(µ − ρ)
dPM (x)
1 − π0 + K P
γKD
=−
−
dx
µ−ρ
(µ − ρ − γ)(µ − ρ)
−(µ − ρ)(1 − π0 + KP ) + γ(1 − π0 + KP − KD )
=−
>0
(µ − ρ)(µ − ρ − γ)
Therefore PM (x) is a straight line with positive slope. For PL (x), if τD = 0, PL (x) =
PM (x). Otherwise,
"Z
PL (x) = E

∞

e−ρt (1 − π0 + KP )X(t)dt − IP −

Z

0

1 − π0 + K P − K D
KD x∗D
=−
x − IP +
µ−ρ
µ−ρ
#
"Z
δ(γ)
∗
e−ρt KD X(t)dt x∗D
+ e−ρτD E



#

∞

e−ρt KD X(t)dt

∗ +δ(γ)
τD
r1

x
x∗D

−

KD
x
µ−ρ

0

cr1
=−
(r1 − 1)(ρ + γ)



x
x∗D

r1
−

1 − π0 + K P
x − IP
µ−ρ

The derivatives of PL (x) for x ∈ [0, x∗D ] are
 r1
dPL (x)
cr1
x0
1 − π0 + K P
=−
x0 − IP
−
∗
dx
(r1 )(ρ + γ) xD
µ−ρ
d2 PL (x)
cr1
=−
r1 (x∗D )r1 xr1 −2 < 0
2
dx
ρ+γ
Therefore, PL (x) is concave ∀x ∈ [0, x∗D ].
Z ∞

−ρτP
PF (x) = sup E
KP X(t)dt − e
IP
τP
τP
Z ∞

Z ∞
−ρt
−ρt
+E
e (1 − π0 )X(t)dt −
e KD X(t)dt
0

δ(γ)
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Using Theorem 3.3.1, with a1 = b1 = b2 = 0, a2 = KP and δ = 0, the supremum is
calculated as
Z

∞

KP X(t)dt − e

sup E
τP

−ρτP


IP =

τP




−KP
µ−ρ

x0 − IP x∗P ≤ x0
 r1
x0
 IP
x0 < x∗P
r1 −1 x∗
P

P
. By taking expectation and summing up the rest of the terms,
where x∗P = − rK1 (µ−ρ)I
P (r1 −1)


 PM (x)
 r1
PF (x) =
x0
 IP
−
r1 −1 x∗
P

x ≥ x∗P
γKD
x
(µ−ρ)(µ−ρ−γ)

−

1−π0
x
µ−ρ

x < x∗P

The derivatives of PF (x) for x ∈ [0, x∗P ] are
 r1
r1 IP
x
γKD
1 − π0
dPF (x)
=
−
−
>0
∗
dx
(r1 − 1)x xP
(µ − ρ)(µ − ρ − γ)
µ−ρ
 r1
r1 IP
x
d2 PF (x)
>0
= 2
2
dx
x
x∗P
Therefore, PF (x) is increasing and convex ∀x ∈ [0, x∗P ]. Player D’s payoffs and their
properties can be found with similar procedures from the following equations.
"Z
#
Z ∞
Z δ(γ)
∞
DM (x) = E
e−ρt (π0 − KP )X(t)dt +
e−ρt KD X(t)dt −
e−ρt cdt
0

δ(γ)

0


 R
R ∞ −ρt
∞ −ρt
e π0 X(t)dt + δ(γ) e KD X(t)dt

DL (x) = E  0 R δ(γ)
R ∞ −ρt
−ρt
− 0 e cdt − τ ∗ e KP X(t)
P
"Z
Z ∞
Z
∞
−ρt
−ρt
DF (x) = E
e (π0 − KP )X(t)dt +
e KD X(t)dt −
0

B.3

∗ +δ(γ)
τD

∗ +δ(γ)
τD

#
e−ρt cdt

∗
τD

Numerical Results

Followings are the critical number for replicating the illustrative example in Section 3.3.3.
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Table B.1
Numerical Results of the Illustrative Example
x∗max

1.125

x∗min

0.983

δ̄

4.375

δ1∗

2.906

δ2∗

4.375

V∗

32.602

x̄

1.137
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